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Abstract
The classic Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem says that every strategy-proof voting rule with
at least three possible candidates must be dictatorial. Similar impossibility results hold even
if we consider a weaker notion of strategy-proofness where voters believe that the other voters’
preferences are i.i.d. (independent and identically distributed). In this paper, we take a bounded-
rationality approach to this problem and consider a setting where voters have “coarse” beliefs
(a notion that has gained popularity in the behavioral economics literature). In particular, we
construct good voting rules that satisfy a notion of strategy-proofness with respect to coarse
i.i.d. beliefs, thus circumventing the above impossibility results.
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1 Introduction
People have long desired to have a good voting rule that is strategy-proof—that is, the voters would
not want to lie about their true preferences. Unfortunately, the celebrated Gibbard-Satterthwaite
theorem [Gib73, Sat75] shows that if there are at least three possible candidates, then any deter-
ministic strategy-proof voting rule has to be dictatorial—that is, there exists a fixed voter whose
top choice is always the winner. Although the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem only applies to deter-
ministic voting rules, Gibbard later generalized the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem to randomized
voting rules [Gib77]. In particular, Gibbard showed that any randomized strategy-proof voting rule
has to be a probability distribution over unilateral rules and duple rules, where a unilateral rule
depends only on a single voter, and a duple rule chooses only between two possible candidates; fur-
thermore, if the voting rule satisfies the natural condition of Pareto efficiency—that is, the voting
rule never chooses a candidate y that is dominated by some other candidate x by every voter—then
the voting rule must be a probability distribution over dictatorial voting rules.
The notion of strategy-proofness, however, is quite strong. It requires voters to truthfully report
their preferences, no matter what preferences the other voters have (and in particular, even if the
voter knows exactly the preferences of everyone else). One may thus hope that these impossibility
results can be circumvented by relaxing this requirement. For instance, for the case of “large-scale”
voting, it makes sense to assume that each voter has some belief about the preferences of the other
voters, and additionally that these preferences are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)—
we refer to such a notion as strategy-proofness w.r.t. (with respect to) i.i.d. beliefs. Unfortunately,
this weakening does not make things much better: A recent result by McLennan [McL11] shows that
if an anonymous1 voting rule (with at least 3 candidates) is strategy-proof w.r.t. all i.i.d. beliefs and
is also Pareto efficient, then the voting rule must be a random dictatorship—that is, a uniformly
random voter’s top choice is chosen as the winner.
Pareto efficiency, however, is a strong condition. When dealing with randomized voting rules,
a natural relaxation (borrowing from the literature on randomized algorithms or cryptography)
would be to allow Pareto efficiency to be violated with some “tiny” probability ǫ. For instance,
if this probability ǫ is exponentially small in the number of voters, then it seems like the voting
rule is still perfectly reasonable. Unfortunately, our first theorem shows that relaxing to ǫ-Pareto
efficiency does not help, even for rather large values of ǫ, and even for a significantly weaker notion
of Pareto efficiency which we call ǫ-super-weak unanimity : ǫ-super-weak unanimity requires that
for every candidate x, there exists some preference profile with x being the top choice of every
voter, such that the voting rule chooses x with probability at least 1− ǫ.
Theorem 1 (Informal). Suppose there are at least three candidates. Let v be any anonymous
randomized voting rule that is strategy-proof w.r.t. all i.i.d. beliefs, and satisfies ǫ-super-weak una-
nimity. Then, v is O(ǫ)-close to the random dictatorship voting rule.
Thus, even for an extremely weak notion of what it means to be a “reasonable” voting rule,
strategy-proofness w.r.t. all i.i.d. beliefs cannot be achieved.
Can bounded-rationality help? In this paper, we consider using notions of “bounded-rationality”
(see e.g., [Sim55]) to overcome the above impossibility results. An initial approach in this direc-
tion was considered by Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT89], who suggested that although vot-
ing manipulations exist, they may be “hard to find”. However, a more recent line of research
[Kel93, CS06, PR07, FKN08, FKKN11, XC08, DP08, IKM12, MR12b, MR12a] has demonstrated
that instances where manipulation is possible are (relatively) common and furthermore, successful
1A voting rule is anonymous if it does not depend on the identity of the voters.
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manipulation can be efficiently computed (if the manipulator has complete knowledge of everyone
else’s preferences). Nevertheless, it may still be conceivable that such computational approaches
may be applicable if we restrict to strategy-proofness w.r.t. i.i.d. beliefs (as in the work of McLennan
[McL11]). We do not pursue this path here.
A different approach suggested by Birrell and Pass [BP11] relaxes strategy-proofness to approx-
imate strategy-proofness, where a voting rule is ǫ-strategy-proof if no voter can gain more than
ǫ in expected utility by lying. However, although [BP11] presents positive results for the case
where ǫ = O(1/n), they also show that Gibbard’s result [Gib77] extends when ǫ = o(1/n2). While
it may be reasonable to assume that (bounded-rational) voters do not care about “small” differ-
ences in expected utility, in some settings a gain of 1/n2 may be too much. Additionally, Carroll
[Car11] demonstrates that a variant of McLennan’s result [McL11] holds even if we just consider
o(1/n3/2)-strategy-proofness w.r.t. i.i.d beliefs, as long as we restrict to deterministic voting rules.
We here consider a new approach to bounded-rationality in voting: we assume that voters have
“coarse” beliefs.
Strategy-proof voting w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs. Several celebrated works in the behavioral
economics literature (e.g., see [Mul02, MSS08]) indicate that humans “think through categories”
and that a more appropriate model of human behavior is obtained by restricting players to have
“coarse” beliefs, where the probabilities are restricted to some coarse set (e.g., a discretization of
[0, 1]) instead of a continuous interval. In this paper, we focus on such “coarse” beliefs: we say that
a belief is α-coarse if the probabilities (the player assigns to states) are restricted to lie on a uniform
discretization of [0, 1] with “mesh size” at least α. Coarse beliefs are very natural. For example, any
belief with rational probabilities is an α-coarse belief for some α > 0. Also, many natural methods
for forming a belief from observations yield α-coarse beliefs where α is inversely proportional to
the number of observations; such methods include taking empirical frequencies, as well as using a
Dirichlet distribution and updating it when samples or data are observed. We note that even if
people form their beliefs using some complicated formula and for instance obtain a belief of the
form “event A happens with probability 1/
√
2”, behavioral experiments (see, e.g., [MRM95, MR94])
suggest that people often “round” such beliefs and interpret them using some coarse measure (e.g.,
event A happens with “very high”/“high”/“medium”/“low”/“very low” probability).
In this paper, we consider strategy-proofness w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs. We focus on “large-
scale” voting, where the number of voters n is sufficiently large but is still polynomially-related to
1/α, where α is the coarseness parameter.
Definition 2 (Informal). A voting rule is large-scale strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs if there
exists a polynomial p(·) such that for every coarseness parameter α > 0, and every n ≥ p(1/α), no
voter having an α-coarse i.i.d. belief can improve her expected utility by lying about her preferences.
We show that there exist anonymous ǫ-Pareto efficient voting rules that are large-scale strategy-
proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, where ǫ is exponentially small in the number of voters.
Theorem 3 (Informal). There exist anonymous ǫ-Pareto efficient voting rules that are large-scale
strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, where ǫ is exponentially small in the number of voters.
Since we are interested in large-scale voting, where we envision the number of voters to exceed
10000, we do not consider the fact that the voting rule only achieves ǫ-Pareto efficiency (as opposed
to “exact” Pareto efficiency) unappealing; the probability of Pareto efficiency being violated is on
the order of 2−100.
Relaxing the coarse i.i.d. belief assumption. So far we have assumed that each voter has an
α-coarse i.i.d. belief. It is well-known that the i.i.d. assumption is seemingly strong in the context
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of voting. To illustrate this, let us recall an example from Chamberlain and Rothschild [CR81]:
Consider a simple majority-rule election with two candidates A and B. If a voter believes that
each of the other voters will vote for candidate A with probability exactly p = 0.51, then in a
large-scale election, the voter will be essentially certain that candidate A will win (the probability
of him casting the pivotal vote will be on the order of e−n, where n is the number of voters). On
the other hand, if a voter is uncertain about the probability p that the other voters will vote for
candidate A (e.g., p is drawn from some distribution over [0.49, 0.53]), then this voter may believe
that both candidates have a significant chance of winning the election and that the probability of
him casting the pivotal vote will be on the order of 1/n. Note that in the latter case (when the
voter is uncertain about p), he no longer has an i.i.d. belief about the preferences of the other voters
(conditioned on p, the belief is indeed i.i.d., but the combined process of first sampling p and then
sampling n− 1 independent preferences (according to p) for the other voters does not result in an
i.i.d. belief; see [CR81] for more discussion on this).
We note, however, that the belief considered above is a distribution over i.i.d. beliefs: we first
sample a belief, and then independently sample preferences for the other voters according to this
belief. Since our notion of large-scale strategy proofness requires strategy-proofness w.r.t. all coarse
i.i.d. beliefs, it directly follows that our notion implies strategy-proofness w.r.t. to all distributions
over coarse i.i.d. beliefs (e.g., the uniform distribution over a discretization of [0.49, 0.53] in the
above example).
Another seemingly strong aspect of i.i.d. beliefs is that a voter believes that each of the other
voters’ preferences is drawn from the same distribution φ (e.g., the distribution determined by p
in the above example). Again, this assumption can be relaxed by allowing the voter to have a
distribution over possible φ’s, and a new φ is sampled for each of the other voters when sampling
their preferences. Such a distribution over possible φ’s can be collapsed to a single distribution
over preferences. In the case of coarse i.i.d. beliefs, as long as the distribution over possible φ’s has
finite support and does not depend on the number of voters, the collapsed distribution will be a
coarse i.i.d. belief. Thus, our notion of large-scale strategy proofness w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs also
directly implies strategy-proofness in this more complicated model. This more complicated model
can be used to model situations where a voter believes that the voting population is separated into
a constant number of communities, and each of the communities has a different distribution φ that
is used to generate the community’s preferences. For simplicity of presentation, we will state our
definitions and results in the more simple model.
1.1 Our Construction
Our construction proceeds in two steps. We first show how to construct voting rules that satisfy ex-
act Pareto efficiency but only a notion of large-scale ǫ-strategy-proofness w.r.t coarse i.i.d. beliefs—
that is, voters can gain at most ǫ in expected utility by lying—where ǫ is exponentially small in the
number of voters n. In a second step, we then show how to transform these voting rules into ones
that satisfy actual strategy-proofness w.r.t coarse i.i.d. beliefs (this, however, comes at the cost of
achieving only ǫ-Pareto efficiency, where ǫ is exponentially small).
Step 1: Achieving ǫ-strategy-proofness. We now explain (at a high level) how we obtain
voting rules that are large-scale ǫ-strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, where ǫ is exponentially
small. To provide some intuition, let us first consider the plurality rule, which simply chooses the
candidate with the most top-choice votes. The plurality rule is not large-scale ǫ-strategy-proof
w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs for an exponentially small ǫ. For example, suppose that a voter has the
preference ordering c > a > b, but she believes that each of the other voters has either the preference
ordering a > b > c, or the preference ordering b > a > c, each with probability 1/2. Such a belief
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is α-coarse for every α ≤ 1/2. Now, we observe that according to her belief, her top choice c will
certainly not be the winner, so she may want to lie and report her second top choice a as her top
choice instead; it can be shown that by doing so, she can increase her expected utility by Ω(1/
√
n).2
In this example, the problem is that the voter believes there are two equally popular candidates,
namely a and b, and by lying, she can make it more likely that the plurality rule chooses candidate
a instead of candidate b.
We now show how to modify the plurality rule in (what we consider) a natural way to make
it large-scale ǫ-strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, where ǫ is exponentially small. Recall that
each voter submits a preference ordering over the entire set of candidates. Our Repeated Plurality
Elimination voting rule proceeds as follows: If there is a “clear winner”—that is, the candidate with
the highest number of top-choice votes beats all the other candidates by a sufficiently large margin
(in terms of the number of top-choice votes), say ≈ √n, then that candidate is chosen as the winner.
Otherwise, we keep all the “great” candidates (i.e., the candidates that are within the ≈ √n margin
of the top candidate) and eliminate all the others. We then restrict the voters’ preference orderings
to only the “great” candidates and recompute the top-choice votes. We repeat this process until
either a “clear winner” has been found, or no more candidates can be eliminated; in the latter case,
we finally apply the traditional plurality rule (without a “margin”) on the remaining candidates.
Intuitively, these modifications solve the specific issue given above where the voter lies and
reports her second top choice a as her top choice, since by Chernoff bounds, with extremely high
probability w.r.t. her belief, the number of top-choice votes for candidates a and b will be within
the margin ≈ √n of each other; in this case, the voter’s lie has no effect, since candidate c will
be eliminated while candidates a and b will move onto the next iteration. In our voting rule, the
elimination process is repeated because after some candidates are eliminated and the top-choice
votes are recounted, the same issue may still be present among the remaining candidates.
More generally, to prove that our Repeated Plurality Elimination voting rule is large-scale ǫ-
strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, we intuitively proceed in two steps: In the first step, we
show that a voter having a coarse belief believes that she only has an exponentially small chance of
influencing which candidates get eliminated: very roughly speaking, a candidate’s expected count
(w.r.t. to the voter’s belief) is either a) equal to the best candidate’s expected count, in which case
by Chernoff bounds, the candidate’s actual count will be within the margin (with overwhelming
probability), or b) different from the best candidate’s expected count, in which case, by Chernoff
bounds and the fact that the voter’s belief is coarse, the candidate’s actual count will be outside
the margin (with overwhelming probability). In the second step, we show that according to each
voter’s belief, at the end of the elimination process, we arrive at a situation where all the remaining
candidates have exactly the same expected count (with overwhelming probability). But if we are
in such a situation, then running plurality is actually strategy-proof.
We also consider a variant of the above Repeated Plurality Elimination voting rule, which we
refer to as the approximate instant-runoff voting rule: at each iteration, instead of eliminating all
the candidates that are not “great”, we instead eliminate all the candidates that are “close” to
the worst candidate, with the following exception: if elimination would cause all the candidates
to be eliminated (i.e., all the candidates are close to the worst one), we select the winner using
the plurality rule. This voting rule is very similar to the widely used instant-runoff voting rule.
Instant-runoff voting, as well as variations of it, are used in many elections throughout the world
(e.g., see [Wik14]). Instant-runoff voting is identical to our “approximate instant-runoff” voting
rule with the exception that at each iteration only the candidate with the actual least number of
2For example, this can be shown by using the analytical tools in [Car11] to establish that with probability Ω(1/
√
n),
the number of top-choice votes for a is equal to that of b, in which case the voter can lie to make a the winner.
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top-choice votes is eliminated (as opposed to eliminating all the candidates that are close to it).
More generally, we develop a general framework for constructing voting rules that are large-scale
ǫ-strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, where ǫ is exponentially small, and show how both of the
above voting rules (as well as several other voting rules) are natural instances of our framework.
All of these voting rules satisfy exact Pareto efficiency.
Step 2: Achieving actual strategy-proofness. In the second step of our construction, we pro-
vide a general technique for converting voting rules that are large-scale ǫ-strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse
i.i.d. beliefs, where ǫ = o(1/n2), into voting rules that are large-scale (actual) strategy-proof
w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs. In fact, such a technique was already provided in [BP11] in the con-
text of strategy-proofness without beliefs (and a variant of it was also explored in [NST12] and
[FKKV13] in more general mechanism design contexts), and we here extend the analysis to the
context of strategy-proofness with beliefs. The idea (from [BP11]) is to combine in a random-
ized way an ǫ-strategy-proof voting rule with a so-called “punishing” voting rule that is strictly
strategy-proof (i.e., voters are strictly better off by truthfully reporting their preferences). The
punishing voting rule may not be Pareto efficient, but the combination is done in such a way that
the punishing voting rule is only run with tiny probability; this suffices for ensuring that the final
voting rule satisfies actual strategy-proofness w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs. Using this technique, we
transform our voting rules into ones that satisfy actual strategy-proofness w.r.t coarse i.i.d. beliefs
while satisfying ǫ-Pareto efficiency, where ǫ is exponentially small. This technique actually requires
the utility functions of the voters to be coarse, so we will add this assumption to our definition of
large-scale strategy-proofness w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs; a utility function is α-coarse if for every
pair of candidates, the utility assigned to the two candidates are either the same or separated by a
gap of at least α.
Discussion. If we ignore our use of the punishing voting rule (which is only run with exponentially
small probability), our voting rules (e.g., our approximate instant-runoff voting rule) are all quite
natural and very similar to what is used in elections throughout the world. Thus, our results
provide some intuition for why strategic misreporting of preferences might not be occurring much
in these elections.
We note that our voting rules are not monotone—that is, improving the ranking of a candidate
in some voter’s preference can decrease the chance of that candidate winning. This is because
improving the ranking of a candidate in some voter’s preference can change which candidates get
eliminated, which then changes the number of top-choice votes each candidate has. This side effect
can also occur in the classic instant-runoff voting rule, which is also not monotone.
1.2 Other Related Work
In this paper, we consider strategy-proofness with respect to a restricted class of beliefs. There
have been other papers that also consider strategy-proofness with respect to a restricted class of
beliefs. In [MS04], Majumdar and Sen show that a large class of voting rules are strategy-proof
w.r.t. the uniform belief where the other voters’ preferences are uniformly distributed. The authors
also show that it is not possible to construct a reasonable deterministic voting rule that is strategy-
proof w.r.t. any of a large set of beliefs where the voters’ preferences are independent of each other;
this further suggests that the consideration of independent preferences is not sufficient and that it
is appropriate to further assume that the preferences are identically distributed. In [She13], Shen
used Beta distributions to model the beliefs of voters (in a way that is different from how we model
beliefs) in the context of approval voting, and showed that voters may still have incentives to lie.
In contrast to the above two papers—which consider very specific types of beliefs—our focus here
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is on defining a general class of natural beliefs for which strategy-proof voting can be achieved.
1.3 Outline of Paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the preliminaries. Section 3 contains
the definition of large-scale strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, our general framework, and
example voting rules. Section 4 contains our impossibility result. All proofs can be found in the
appendices.
2 Preliminaries
Given an integer k ∈ N, let [k] = {1, . . . , k}. Let C be any finite set of candidates (or alternatives).
A preference ordering on C is a strict total order on the set of candidates C; let P denote the set
of all preference orderings on C. Given a subset A ⊆ C of candidates, let L(A) denote the set of
preference orderings (i.e., strict total orders) on A. Given a preference ordering P and a pair of
candidates x, y ∈ C, we shall write xPy to mean that x is (strictly) preferred over y in P , i.e.,
x is ranked higher than y according to P . Given a preference ordering P , let top(P ) denote the
highest-ranked candidate according to P , i.e., top(P ) is the candidate x in C such that xPy for
every y ∈ C \ {x}.
Throughout this paper, we will use n to denote the number of voters, and m to denote the
number of candidates in C; we will often treat m as a constant. A preference profile is a vector of
length n whose components are preference orderings in P; that is, a preference profile is simply an
element of Pn which specifies the (submitted) preference orderings of n voters.
Given a finite set S, let ∆(S) denote the set of all probability distributions over S. A (ran-
domized) voting rule is a function v : Pn → ∆(C) (or v : P∗ → ∆(C) if v works for any number of
voters) that maps preference profiles to probability distributions over candidates; intuitively, v(P )
is a distribution over C that specifies the probability that each candidate is selected when the sub-
mitted votes form the preference profile P . A voting rule v is said to be deterministic if for every
preference profile P , the distribution v(P ) assigns probability 1 to some candidate. A voting rule v
is said to be anonymous if v does not depend on the order in which the preference orderings appear
in the input, i.e., v(P1, . . . , Pn) = v(Pσ(1), . . . , Pσ(n)) for every preference profile (P1, . . . , Pn) ∈ Pn
and every permutation σ : [n]→ [n]. In this paper, we will only consider anonymous voting rules;
most common voting rules are indeed anonymous, and one can argue that anonymous voting rules
are more fair and democratic than non-anonymous ones.
Given a (randomized) voting rule v : Pn → ∆(C), a candidate x ∈ C, and a preference profile
P , let v(x,P ) be the probability mass assigned to x by the distribution v(P ); we also refer to
v(x,P ) as the selection probability of x with respect to v and P , since v(x,P ) is the probability
that candidate x is selected by the voting rule v when the input preference profile is P . A utility
function is a function u : C → [0, 1] that assigns a real number in [0, 1] to each candidate in C 3.
Given a preference ordering P and a utility function u, we say that u is consistent with P if for
every pair of candidates x, y ∈ C, we have u(x) > u(y) if and only if xPy.
A voting rule is Pareto efficient if it never chooses a Pareto dominated candidate, i.e., a candi-
date y such that all the voters prefer x over y for some candidate x. A slight relaxation of Pareto
efficiency is ǫ-Pareto efficiency, where we allow the voting rule to choose a Pareto dominated
candidate with probability at most ǫ.
3It is not important that the codomain of the utility function u is [0, 1]; as long as the codomain is bounded, the
results of this paper still hold with minor modifications.
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Definition 4 (ǫ-Pareto efficiency). A voting rule v : Pn → ∆(C) is ǫ-Pareto efficient if for every
pair of candidates x, y ∈ C and every preference profile P = (P1, . . . , Pn) ∈ Pn such that xPiy for
every i ∈ [n], we have v(y,P ) ≤ ǫ.
The random dictatorship voting rule is the voting rule vdict that chooses a voter uniformly at
random and then chooses her top choice, i.e., for every preference profile P = (P1, . . . , Pn) ∈ Pn
and every candidate x ∈ C, we have vdict(x,P ) = |{i∈[n]:top(Pi)=x}|n .
See Appendix A for background information on the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [Gib73,
Sat75] and Gibbard’s generalization of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem to randomized voting
rules [Gib77].
2.1 Strategy-Proofness with respect to a Set of Beliefs
Gibbard’s generalization [Gib77] of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem shows that when there are
at least three candidates, we cannot even construct good randomized voting rules that are strategy-
proof. Given this impossibility result, let us consider relaxed notions of strategy-proofness. We
observe that strategy-proofness requires that no voter would want to lie about her true preference
even if the voter knows the submitted preferences of all the other voters. However, in many
realistic scenarios, a voter is uncertain about how other voters will vote, and she would only lie if
she believes that she can gain utility in expectation by lying. As a result, we consider a relaxed
notion of strategy-proofness where we consider the voter’s belief of how the other voters will vote.
The standard notion of strategy-proofness requires that no voter would want to lie regardless of
what her belief is. To weaken the notion of strategy-proof, one can require that no voter would
want to lie as long as her belief belongs in a certain set of beliefs. Let us now move to formalizing
these notions.
In this paper, we will only consider beliefs that are i.i.d. (independent and identically dis-
tributed), meaning that for each belief, the other voters’ preference orderings are sampled inde-
pendently from some distribution φ over preference orderings. Thus, for simplicity, we define a
belief to be a probability distribution over the set P of preference orderings, representing a voter’s
belief that each of the other voters will have a preference ordering drawn independently from this
distribution. We now state the definition of strategy-proof with respect to a set of beliefs.
Definition 5 (Strategy-proof w.r.t. a set Φ of beliefs). A voting rule v : Pn → ∆(C) is strategy-
proof w.r.t. a set Φ of beliefs if for every i ∈ [n], every pair of preference orderings Pi, P ′i ∈ P,
every belief φ ∈ Φ, and every utility function ui that is consistent with Pi, we have
E[ui(v(P−i, Pi))] ≥ E[ui(v(P−i, P ′i ))],
where P−i ∼ φn−1.
3 Large-Scale Strategy-Proof Voting w.r.t. Coarse i.i.d. Beliefs
In this section, we first define the notion of “coarse” i.i.d. beliefs; then, we introduce the notion
of large-scale strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs. We then develop a general framework for
constructing voting rules that are large-scale ǫ-strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, and we
then use the general framework to obtain many examples of good voting rules. We then show how
to transform these voting rules into ones that are actually large-scale strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse
i.i.d. beliefs.
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Let us begin by introducing the notion of a coarse i.i.d. belief. Roughly speaking, an i.i.d. belief
φ is α-coarse if the probability masses assigned by φ are restricted to lie on a uniform discretization
of [0, 1] with “mesh size” at least α. More precisely, an i.i.d. belief φ is said to be α-coarse if the
probability masses assigned by φ are multiples of some number β ≥ α, i.e., there exists a number
β ≥ α such that for every preference ordering P ∈ P, we have φ(P ) = iβ for some integer i. Coarse
i.i.d. beliefs are quite natural due to many reasons. For example, if a human were to describe or
represent her belief (as a distribution over preference orderings), the probabilities would almost
certainly be rational numbers (e.g., it is very strange to believe that a certain preference ordering
has probability 1/π of occurring), and an i.i.d. belief with rational probabilities is an α-coarse
i.i.d. belief for some α > 0. Also, many common and natural ways of forming a belief also result
in a coarse i.i.d. belief. For example, one can use empirical frequencies or a Dirichlet distribution
to form a belief from observed samples of preferences. Both of these methods yield α-coarse
i.i.d. beliefs, where α is inversely proportional to the number of observations. See Appendix B for
more information. We can also consider α-coarse utility functions. A utility function u : C → [0, 1] is
said to be α-coarse if for every pair of candidates x, y ∈ C, we have u(x) = u(y) or |u(x)−u(y)| ≥ α.
We only need the utility functions to be coarse for the “punishing” voting rule that we will use
later.
Large-scale strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs. Let us now introduce the notion of
large-scale strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, which is a notion of strategy-proof where the
voters have coarse i.i.d. beliefs and there are sufficiently (but still polynomially) many voters.
Definition 6 (Large-scale strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs). A voting rule v : P∗ → ∆(C)
is large-scale strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs if there exists a polynomial p(·) such that for
every α > 0, every n ≥ p( 1α), every i ∈ [n], every pair of preference orderings Pi, P ′i ∈ P, every
α-coarse i.i.d. belief φi, and every α-coarse utility function ui that is consistent with Pi, we have
E[ui(v(P−i, Pi))] ≥ E[ui(v(P−i, P ′i ))],
where P−i ∼ φin−1; when this holds, we may refer to the above polynomial p(·) as the rate of the
voting rule v.
In the above definition, α controls the coarseness of the belief, and p(1/α) controls how many
voters are required in order to achieve truthfulness; we need n to be sufficiently large because as
the i.i.d. beliefs become less and less coarse, the set of beliefs considered becomes closer and closer
to the set of all i.i.d. beliefs, which we later show is impossible to construct good voting rules for.
The rate p(·) captures how many voters are needed relative to the coarseness of the beliefs.
As mentioned in the introduction, we can consider a slightly more realistic model where each
voter has a distribution over α-coarse i.i.d. beliefs, and when computing expected utility for a
voter, a single α-coarse i.i.d. belief is sampled from this distribution, and then this sampled belief
is used to generate all the other voters’ preferences in an i.i.d. manner. Our results still hold in this
more realistic model; this easily follows from the definition of large-scale strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse
i.i.d. beliefs, where it is required that strategy-proofness holds for every α-coarse belief, so strategy-
proofness also holds if we sample a random α-coarse i.i.d. belief from a distribution.
We now define a relaxed version of large-scale strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, where
we allow a voter to gain at most ǫ(n) in expected utility.
Definition 7 (Large-scale ǫ-strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs). A voting rule v : P∗ → ∆(C)
is large-scale ǫ-strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs if there exists a polynomial p(·) such that
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for every α > 0, every n ≥ p( 1α), every i ∈ [n], every pair of preference orderings Pi, P ′i ∈ P, every
α-coarse i.i.d. belief φi, and every α-coarse utility function ui that is consistent with Pi, we have
E[ui(v(P−i, Pi))] ≥ E[ui(v(P−i, P ′i ))]− ǫ(n),
where P−i ∼ φin−1; when this holds, we may refer to the above polynomial p(·) as the rate of the
voting rule v.
3.1 Our General Framework
In this section, we develop a general framework for constructing large-scale ǫ-strategy-proof voting
rules w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs. Later, we will show how to transform such voting rules into ones
that satisfy actual large-scale strategy-proofness w.r.t coarse i.i.d. beliefs. Before we describe the
general framework in detail, let us describe an example for motivation.
Recall that the plurality rule simply chooses the candidate with the most top-choice votes. The
plurality rule is simple, very commonly used, and intuitively has good efficiency (e.g., it is Pareto ef-
ficient). Unfortunately, the plurality rule is not large-scale ǫ-strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs
for any exponentially small ǫ. However, it is not hard to see that the plurality rule is strategy-proof
w.r.t. beliefs where all the candidates have the same probability of being the top choice of a voter’s
preference ordering. Can one design an “elimination rule” that eliminates candidates in a way so
that (1) a voter with a coarse i.i.d. belief will believe that she only has an exponentially small
chance of affecting which candidates get eliminated, and (2) once these candidates are eliminated
from her belief, all the remaining candidates will have the same probability of being the top choice?
Intuitively, by running such an elimination rule and then running the plurality rule on the remaining
candidates, the combined voting rule is large-scale ǫ-strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, where
ǫ is exponentially small. Such an elimination rule exists; it repeatedly eliminates the candidates
whose number of top-choice votes is not “close” to the highest number of top-choice votes. We will
later show that this elimination rule satisfies the two required properties.
The above example can be viewed as an instantiation of a more general framework for con-
structing voting rules that are large-scale ǫ-strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, which we now
describe. The general framework consists of an “elimination rule” and a “selection rule” satisfy-
ing certain properties. The elimination rule will choose a subset of the candidates, and then the
selection rule will select a winner from this subset. As long as certain properties are satisfied, the
elimination rule combined with the selection rule will be large-scale ǫ-strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse
i.i.d. beliefs. Let us now informally describe the general procedure and the requirements.
On input a preference profile, we do the following:
Stage 1: Run an “elimination rule” that, on input a preference profile, eliminates a subset of the
candidates, leaving a subset A ⊆ C remaining. We require the following: a single voter with
a coarse i.i.d. belief φ has little influence on the choice A of the elimination rule when the
other voters’ preferences are distributed according to φ; furthermore, with high probability,
the restriction of the belief φ to the remaining candidates A results in a belief in some set
Φ′A.
Stage 2: Run a “selection rule” on the preference profile restricted to the remaining candidates
A. We require that the selection rule is strategy-proof w.r.t. the set Φ′A of beliefs from Stage
1.
Intuitively, the above procedure is large-scale ǫ-strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs because
a voter i with a coarse i.i.d. belief φ will believe that she has little influence on the choice A of
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the elimination rule, and since the restriction of φ to A is a belief for which the selection rule is
strategy-proof, voter i cannot gain much by lying.
We now describe the framework more formally. An elimination rule is a function f : P∗ →
∆(2C) that, on input a preference profile P , outputs a non-empty subset A ⊆ C representing the
remaining candidates after elimination. Recall that given a subset A ⊆ C of candidates, we use
L(A) to denote the set of preference orderings on A. A selection rule is a collection of functions
{sA : (L(A))∗ → ∆(A)}A⊆C,A 6=∅, one for each non-empty subset A ⊆ C, such that for every A ⊆ C,
sA is a voting rule for the set of candidates A. Given a selection rule s = {sA}A⊆C,A 6=∅ and a
preference profile P whose components are preference orderings over A, let s(P ) = sA(P ).
Given a preference profile P and a non-empty subset A ⊆ C of candidates, let the restriction of
P to A, denoted P |A, be the preference profile obtained by removing all the candidates in P that
are not in A, while preserving the ordering of the remaining candidates. Given an i.i.d. belief φ and
a non-empty subset A ⊆ C of candidates, let the restriction of φ to A, denoted φ|A, be the belief
(i.e., distribution over preference orderings on A) P |A, where P ∼ φ. We now state our theorem
that precisely describes our general framework.
Theorem 8 (Our general framework). Let f : P∗ → ∆(2C) be any elimination rule, and let
s = {sA}A⊆C,A 6=∅ be any selection rule. Let δ : N → R be any function. Suppose there exists a
polynomial p(·) such that for every α > 0 and every n ≥ p( 1α), the following holds:
• For every i ∈ [n] and every α-coarse i.i.d. belief φi, there exists a non-empty subset A ⊆ C of
candidates such that the following conditions hold:
– For every Pi ∈ P, the elimination rule f(P−i, Pi) chooses (to keep) A with probability
at least 1− δ(n) over the randomness of P−i ∼ φin−1 and f .
– sA is strategy-proof w.r.t. the restricted belief φi|A.
Then, the voting rule v : P∗ → ∆(C) defined by v(P ) = s(P |f(P )) is large-scale 2δ-strategy-proof
w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, and the rate of v is the polynomial p(·).
See Appendix C for the proof of Theorem 8.
3.2 Examples of our General Framework
In this section, we provide some examples of our general framework. Recall that the plurality
rule simply chooses the candidate with the most top-choice votes (breaking ties in some way). We
now describe a modified plurality rule in the format of our general framework; this voting rule is
equivalent to the repeated plurality elimination voting rule described earlier and in the introduction
of this paper.
Example 9 (Repeated Plurality Elimination + Plurality Selection). Let 0 < δ < 1/2, and
let vpl : P∗ → ∆(C) be a voting rule defined as follows; on input a preference profile P ∈ Pn, vpl
does the following:
Stage 1: Repeatedly do the following until no more candidates are eliminated: count the number
of top-choice votes for each candidate, and eliminate all the candidates that have a count
that is not within n1/2+δ of the highest count among the remaining candidates; restrict the
preference profile to the set of remaining candidates.
Stage 2: Run the plurality rule for the remaining candidates, i.e., on the preference profile re-
stricted to the set of remaining candidates.
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Using our general framework, we now show that vpl is large-scale ǫ-strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse
i.i.d. beliefs (where ǫ is exponentially small), and also satisfies certain efficiency properties.
Theorem 10. Let 0 < δ < 1/2, and let vpl be the voting rule defined above. Then, vpl satisfies the
following properties:
1. vpl is large-scale (e
−Ω(n2δ))-strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, with rate p(x) = O(x⌈1/(1/2−δ)⌉).
2. vpl is Pareto efficient.
3. vpl is n
1/2+δ-close to optimal in the sense that vpl always chooses a candidate c ∈ C such that
the number of top-choice votes for c is within n1/2+δ of the highest number of top-choice votes
among the candidates.
See Appendix C for the proof of Theorem 10. Recall that we will later combine this voting rule
with a “punishing” voting rule to obtain a voting rule that is large-scale (actual) strategy-proof
w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs.
Example 11 (Approximate Instant-Runoff Voting). The standard instant-runoff voting rule
repeats the following until a candidate has been chosen as the winner: count the number of top-
choice votes for each candidate, and eliminate the candidate with the least number of top-choice
votes (breaking ties in some way); restrict the preference profile to the set of remaining candidates,
and if there is only one candidate remaining, choose the candidate to be the winner.
It is not hard to see that the standard instant-runoff voting rule is not large-scale ǫ-strategy-
proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, where ǫ is reasonably small. However, we can slightly modify
the standard instant-runoff voting rule to obtain an approximate version that is large-scale ǫ-
strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, where ǫ is exponentially small. In each iteration, instead
of eliminating only the candidate with the least number of top-choice votes, we eliminate all the
candidates that have a count that is close to the least number of top-choice votes; however, we
stop right before all the remaining candidates are about to be eliminated, and then we choose the
candidate with the most top-choice votes. Let us now put our approximate instant-runoff voting
rule in the format of our general framework.
Let 0 < δ < 1/2, and let virv : P∗ → ∆(C) be a voting rule defined as follows; on input a
preference profile P ∈ Pn, virv does the following:
Stage 1: Repeat the following: Count the number of top-choice votes for each candidate, and
eliminate all the candidates that have a count that is within n1/2+δ of the least number of
top-choice votes, unless doing so would eliminate all the remaining candidates, in which case
we simply stop and proceed to Stage 2; restrict the preference profile to the set of remaining
candidates.
Stage 2: Run the plurality rule for the remaining candidates, i.e., on the preference profile re-
stricted to the set of remaining candidates.
Using our general framework, we now show that virv is large-scale ǫ-strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse
i.i.d. beliefs (where ǫ is exponentially small), and also satisfies certain efficiency properties.
Theorem 12. Let 0 < δ < 1/2, and let virv be the voting rule defined above. Then, virv satisfies
the following properties:
1. virv is large-scale (e
−Ω(n2δ))-strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, with rate p(x) = O(x⌈1/(1/2−δ)⌉).
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2. virv is Pareto efficient.
See Appendix C for the proof of Theorem 12. Recall that we will later combine this voting rule
with a “punishing” voting rule to obtain a voting rule that is large-scale (actual) strategy-proof
w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs.
In Appendix D, we provide some more examples of our general framework.
3.3 Achieving Actual Strategy-Proofness via the Punishing Voting Rule
In this section, we show how to transform our voting rules into ones that are actually strategy-proof
w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs. We do this by providing a general technique for converting voting rules
that are large-scale ǫ-strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, where ǫ = o(1/n2), into voting rules
that are large-scale (actual) strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs. The idea is to combine in
a randomized way an ǫ-strategy-proof voting rule with a “punishing” voting rule that is “strictly
strategy-proof”. The punishing voting rule is defined as follows:
• Let vpunish : Pn → ∆(C) be the voting rule that chooses a voter i ∈ [n] uniformly at random
and then chooses the jth top choice of voter i with probability proportional to m − j, i.e.,
with probability (m− j)/∑mℓ=1(m− ℓ).
We now show that vpunish is strictly strategy-proof in the sense that if a voter lies about her
preference ordering, her expected utility will be strictly less than what it would be if she submitted
her true preference ordering, and the difference in the two expected utilities is at least Ω(α/n),
where α is the coarseness of the utility function.
Lemma 13. The voting rule vpunish is “strictly strategy-proof” in the following sense: For every
α > 0, every i ∈ [n], every pair of preference orderings Pi, P ′i ∈ P with Pi 6= P ′i , every P−i ∈ Pn−1,
and every α-coarse utility function ui that is consistent with Pi, we have
E[ui(vpunish(P−i, Pi))] ≥ E[ui(vpunish(P−i, P ′i ))] + Ω(α/n).
See Appendix E for the proof of Lemma 13. We now show that if we take a voting rule v that
is large-scale ǫ-strategy proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, where ǫ = o(1/n2), and “mix” it with the
punishing voting rule vpunish by running v with probability 1 − q and vpunish with probability q
for some appropriately chosen q = Ω(n2 · ǫ(n)), then the “mixed” voting rule is large-scale (actual)
strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs.
Lemma 14. Let v : P∗ → ∆(C) be any voting rule that is large-scale ǫ-strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse
i.i.d. beliefs, where ǫ(n) = o(1/n2). Let vmix be the voting rule that runs v with probability 1− q(n)
and runs vpunish with probability q(n), where q(n) = Ω(n
2 ·ǫ(n)). Then, vmix is large-scale strategy-
proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs.
See Appendix E for the proof of Lemma 14. We now combine the punishing voting rule with
our general framework (Theorem 8) to obtain a new general framework for obtaining voting rules
that are large-scale (actual) strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs.
Theorem 15. Let v : P∗ → ∆(C) be a voting rule as defined in Theorem 8 with corresponding
function δ(n) = o(1/n2). Let vmix be the voting rule that runs v with probability 1− q(n) and runs
vpunish with probability q(n), where q(n) = Ω(n
2 · δ(n)). Then, vmix is large-scale strategy-proof
w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs.
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Proof. The theorem follows by combining Theorem 8 with Lemma 14.
Using the punishing voting rule, we can also transform our previous voting rules into ones that
are large-scale (actual) strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, and ǫ-Pareto efficient, where ǫ is
exponentially small.
Theorem 16 (Repeated Plurality Elimination + Plurality Selection). There exists a con-
stant C > 0 such that the following holds. Let 0 < δ < 1/2, and let vpl be the voting rule in
Theorem 10. Let v′pl be the voting rule that runs vpl with probability 1 − e−Cn
2δ
and runs vpunish
with probability e−Cn
2δ
. Then, v′pl satisfies the following properties:
1. v′pl is large-scale strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, with rate p(x) = O(x
⌈1/(1/2−δ)⌉).
2. v′pl is e
−Ω(n2δ)-Pareto efficient.
3. With probability at least 1−e−Ω(n2δ), v′pl is n1/2+δ-close to optimal in the sense that v′pl chooses
a candidate c ∈ C such that the number of top-choice votes for c is within n1/2+δ of the highest
number of top-choice votes among the candidates.
Proof. The theorem immediately follows by combining Theorem 10 with Lemma 14.
Theorem 17 (Approximate Instant-Runoff Voting). There exists a constant C > 0 such that
the following holds. Let 0 < δ < 1/2, and let virv be the voting rule in Theorem 12. Let v
′
irv be
the voting rule that runs virv with probability 1 − e−Cn2δ and runs vpunish with probability e−Cn2δ .
Then, v′irv satisfies the following properties:
1. v′irv is large-scale strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, with rate p(x) = O(x
⌈1/(1/2−δ)⌉).
2. v′irv is e
−Ω(n2δ)-Pareto efficient.
Proof. The theorem immediately follows by combining Theorem 12 with Lemma 14.
4 Impossibility of Strategy-Proofness w.r.t. all i.i.d. Beliefs
In this section, we prove our impossibility result that says that if there are at least three candidates,
then it is not possible to construct a voting rule that is strategy-proof for all i.i.d. beliefs and satisfies
ǫ-super-weak unanimity, unless the voting rule is O(ǫ)-close to being the random dictatorship voting
rule. This section is self-contained, and the other sections do not rely on the material in this section;
as a result, the reader can safely skip this section if he or she wishes to do so.
We begin with some definitions. We call a voting rule weakly strategy-proof if it is strategy-proof
with respect to the set of all i.i.d. beliefs.
Definition 18 (Weakly strategy-proof). A voting rule v : Pn → ∆(C) is weakly strategy-proof if
v is strategy proof with respect to the set of all i.i.d. beliefs.
Suppose all the voters have the same top choice, say candidate x; then, we would expect the
voting rule to choose x as the winner. We call this property strong unanimity ; again, we slightly
relax this property to ǫ-strong unanimity, where we allow the voting rule to choose the common
top candidate with probability at least 1− ǫ instead of probability 1.
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Definition 19 (ǫ-strong unanimity). A voting rule v : Pn → ∆(C) satisfies ǫ-strong unanimity if
for every candidate x ∈ C and every preference profile P = (P1, . . . , Pn) ∈ Pn such that top(Pi) = x
for every i ∈ [n], we have v(x,P ) ≥ 1− ǫ.
It is easy to see that strong unanimity is weaker than Pareto efficiency (modulo a factor of m
for the ǫ version of the properties). Now, suppose all the voters have the exact same preference
ordering P ; then, we would expect the voting rule to choose the top candidate of P . We call this
property weak unanimity ; again, we state an ǫ version of the definition.
Definition 20 (ǫ-weak unanimity). A voting rule v : Pn → ∆(C) satisfies ǫ-weak unanimity if
for every preference ordering P ∈ P and every preference profile P = (P1, . . . , Pn) ∈ Pn such that
Pi = P for every i ∈ [n], we have v(top(P ),P ) ≥ 1− ǫ.
It is clear that ǫ-weak unanimity is weaker than ǫ-strong unanimity. We finally define ǫ-super-
weak unanimity, which is even weaker than ǫ-weak unanimity, and requires that for every candidate
x ∈ C, there exists some preference profile P with x at the top of every preference ordering in P ,
such that the voting rule on P will choose x as the winner with probability at least 1− ǫ.
Definition 21 (ǫ-super-weak unanimity). A voting rule v : Pn → ∆(C) satisfies ǫ-super-weak
unanimity if for every candidate x ∈ C, there exists a preference profile P = (P1, . . . , Pn) ∈ Pn
with top(Pi) = x for every i ∈ [n], such that v(x,P ) ≥ 1− ǫ.
ǫ-super-weak unanimity is a very weak property that all reasonable voting rules should have.
We now define what it means for two voting rules to be ǫ-close to each other.
Definition 22. Let v, v′ : Pn → ∆(C) be two randomized voting rules. We say that v is ǫ-close to
v′ if for every preference profile P and every candidate x ∈ C, we have |v(x,P )− v′(x,P )| ≤ ǫ.
We now formally state our theorem.
Theorem 23. Suppose there are at least three candidates in C, i.e., |C| ≥ 3. Let v : Pn → ∆(C)
be any anonymous randomized voting rule that is weakly strategy-proof and satisfies ǫ-super-weak
unanimity. Then, v is O(ǫ)-close to the random dictatorship voting rule.
Let us briefly mention some aspects of our proof. Our proof uses some tools from McLennan’s
impossibility result [McL11] and Gibbard’s generalization of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
[Gib77]. However, our result does not follow from generalizing McLennan’s proof. For example,
using McLennan’s proof, it is not clear how one can weaken the assumption of Pareto efficiency to
ǫ-Pareto efficiency and still show that the voting rule is close to random dictatorship. By adding
“error terms” at various places of McLennan’s proof, it is not too difficult to show that the voting
rule v is O(ǫn)-close to random dictatorship. However, if ǫn is large (e.g., ǫn = Ω(1)), then the
result is not meaningful. In particular, such a result does not prevent the possibility of constructing
a voting rule that is 1/n-Pareto efficient and weakly strategy-proof. Our impossibility result shows
that the voting rule v is O(ǫ)-close to random dictatorship, as opposed to O(ǫn)-close; in order to
prove this, we needed to use different analyses and go through substantially more work.
We will now prove Theorem 23. We will prove a sequence of lemmas and claims that describe
properties that the voting rule v must have, which will be used to show that v is O(ǫ)-close to the
random dictatorship voting rule.
We first establish some notation and terminology that will be used later; most of the no-
tation and terminology comes from [Gib77], which is Gibbard’s generalization of the Gibbard-
Satterthwaite theorem to randomized voting rules. Given a preference ordering P and a pair of
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candidates x, y ∈ C, we shall write xP !y to mean that x is directly on top of y in the preference
ordering P , i.e., xPy and for every candidate z ∈ C \{x, y}, we have zPx if and only if zPy. Given
a preference ordering P and a candidate y ∈ C, let P y be the preference ordering P except that y
is swapped with the candidate directly above y, if such a candidate exists.
A voting rule v : Pn → ∆(C) is said to be pairwise responsive if for every preference profile
P = (P1, . . . , Pn) ∈ Pn, every i ∈ [n], and every pair of candidates x, y ∈ C such that xPi!y,
we have v(z, (P−i, Pi
y)) = v(z,P ) for every candidate z ∈ C \ {x, y}. Intuitively, a voting rule is
pairwise responsive if for any preference profile, if we take a voter’s preference ordering and swap two
adjacent candidates, then only the selection probabilities of the swapped candidates can possibly
change; the selection probabilities of the other candidates (not involved in the swap) remain the
same. This implies that if a voting rule is pairwise responsive and we swap two adjacent candidates
in a voter’s preference ordering, then the change in the selection probability of one of the swapped
candidates is the exact opposite (i.e., the additive inverse) of the change in the selection probability
of the other swapped candidate; this is because the selection probabilities of all the candidates must
sum up to 1.
A voting rule v : Pn → ∆(C) is said to be pairwise isolated if for every x, y ∈ C, every
i ∈ [n], and every P = (P1, . . . , Pn),P ′ = (P ′1, . . . , P ′n) ∈ Pn such that xPi!y, P ′i = Pi, and
the relative ordering of x and y for Pj is the same as that for P
′
j for every j ∈ [n], we have
v(y, (P ′−i, P
′
i
y))−v(y,P ′) = v(y, (P−i, Piy))−v(y,P ). Intuitively, a voting rule is pairwise isolated
if for any preference profile, if we take a voter i’s preference ordering and swap two adjacent
candidates x and y with x being on top of y, then the change in the selection probability of y only
depends on voter i’s preference ordering and the relative ordering of x and y in the other voters’
preference orderings.
It is already known that anonymous randomized weakly strategy-proof voting rules are both
pairwise responsive and pairwise isolated (see [McL11]).
Lemma 24 ([McL11]). Let v : Pn → ∆(C) be any anonymous randomized voting rule that is weakly
strategy-proof. Then, v is pairwise responsive and pairwise isolated.
Proof. This immediately follows from Lemmas 1, 2, and 3 in [McL11], where Lemmas 2 and 3 in
[McL11] follow immediately from Lemmas 1 and 3 in [Gib77].
We will use Lemma 24 at various places below. We now show that if a voting rule is weakly
strategy-proof and satisfies ǫ-super-weak unanimity, then it also satisfies ǫ-strong unanimity.
Lemma 25. Let v : Pn → ∆(C) be any anonymous randomized voting rule that is weakly strategy-
proof and satisfies ǫ-super-weak unanimity. Then, v satisfies ǫ-strong unanimity.
The proof of Lemma 25 uses the pairwise responsive property of v (Lemma 24) to obtain ǫ-
strong unanimity from ǫ-super-weak unanimity; see Appendix F for the proof of Lemma 25. Given
a preference profile P = (P1, . . . , Pn) ∈ Pn, let top(P ) = (top(P1), . . . , top(Pn)). We now show
that if a voting rule is weakly strategy-proof and satisfies ǫ-super-weak unanimity, then the voting
rule is “close to” being “tops-only”, i.e., depending only on the vector top(P ) of top choices of
the preference orderings in the input P ; the ordering of the candidates below the top choices only
affect the probabilities of the voting rule by a small amount O(ǫ).
Lemma 26. Let v : Pn → ∆(C) be any anonymous randomized voting rule that is weakly strategy-
proof and satisfies ǫ-super-weak unanimity. Then, for every pair of preference profiles P ,P ′ ∈ Pn
such that top(P ) = top(P ′), we have |v(x,P )− v(x,P ′)| ≤ mǫ for every x ∈ C.
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The proof of Lemma 26 uses the pairwise isolation property (Lemma 24) and the ǫ-strong
unanimity property (Lemma 25); the greatest difficulty in the proof lies in ensuring that the error
(the mǫ in Lemma 26) is O(ǫ) instead of O(ǫn), which is much too large. See Appendix F for
the proof of Lemma 26. We now show that if a voting rule is weakly strategy-proof and satisfies
ǫ-super-weak unanimity, then the selection probability of any candidate x is “close to” depending
only on the number of voters with x as the top choice; the top choices of the other voters only
affect the selection probability of x by a small amount O(ǫ).
Lemma 27. Let v : Pn → ∆(C) be any anonymous randomized voting rule that is weakly strategy-
proof and satisfies ǫ-super-weak unanimity. Then, for every candidate x ∈ C, and every pair of
preference profiles P = (P1, . . . , Pn),P
′ = (P ′1, . . . , P
′
n) ∈ Pn such that |{i ∈ [n] : top(Pi) = x}| =
|{i ∈ [n] : top(P ′i ) = x}|, we have |v(x,P )− v(x,P ′)| ≤ 2mǫ.
See Appendix F for the proof of Lemma 27.
We now use the above lemmas to prove Theorem 23. Suppose |C| ≥ 3. Fix v : Pn → ∆(C)
to be any anonymous randomized voting rule that is weakly strategy-proof and satisfies ǫ-super-
weak unanimity. By Lemma 24, v is pairwise responsive and pairwise isolated, and by Lemma
25, v also satisfies ǫ-strong unanimity. We know from Lemma 27 that the selection probability
of any candidate x is close to depending only on the number of voters with x as the top choice.
Thus, we will define a function v′ : C × {0, . . . , n} that, on input a candidate x ∈ C and a number
j ∈ {0, . . . , n}, specifies the approximate selection probability of x when exactly j voters have x as
their top choice.
Let C = {a1, . . . , am}, where a1, . . . , am is any fixed ordering of the candidates in C. Let
v′ : C × {0, . . . , n} → [0, 1] be defined by v′(x, j) = v(x,P x,j), where P x,j = (P1, . . . , Pn) is the
preference profile defined as follows: for i = 1, . . . , j, let the top choice of Pi be candidate x and let
the other candidates be ordered according to the ordering a1, . . . , am; for i = j + 1, . . . n, let Pi be
the ordering a1, . . . , am with candidate x moved to the bottom. By Lemma 27, the following claim
follows immediately.
Claim 28. For every preference profile P = (P1, . . . , Pn) with j := |{i ∈ [n] : top(Pi) = x}|, and
every candidate x ∈ C, we have |v(x,P )− v′(x, j)| ≤ 2mǫ.
We now show that the candidates are “close to being anonymous” in the sense that changing
the candidate in the input for v′ only changes the value of v′ by a small amount O(ǫ).
Claim 29. For every pair of candidates x, y ∈ C and every j ∈ {0, . . . , n}, we have |v′(x, j) −
v′(y, j)| ≤ 14mǫ.
See Appendix F for the proof of Claim 29. We now show that for any candidate x ∈ C, the
function v′(x, ·) is “close to being linear” in the following sense: When the number of top choice
votes for candidate x (i.e., the j in v′(x, j)) is increased by ℓ, the change in v′(x, ·) depends very
little on how many top choice votes candidate x had initially, which can only affect the change in
v′(x, ·) by a small amount O(ǫ). This roughly means that as the number of top choice votes for
candidate x increases, the selection probability of x increases roughly linearly.
Claim 30. Let x ∈ C, let j, j′ ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}, and let ℓ ∈ [n] such that j + ℓ ≤ n and j′ + ℓ ≤ n.
Then,
v′(x, j + ℓ)− v′(x, j) = v′(x, j′ + ℓ)− v′(x, j′) + δ
for some δ ∈ R such that |δ| ≤ 64mǫ.
16
See Appendix F for the proof of Claim 30. Using Claim 30, we now show that v′(x, j) (which
approximates the selection probability of candidate x with j top choice votes) is close to jn , which
is the selection probability of x for the random dictatorship voting rule. Even though Claim 30
says that v′(x, j) is close to being linear, naive usage of Claim 30 would result in O(ǫn) error, which
is too high; however, by using a better approach, we can make the error only O(ǫ).
Claim 31. Let x ∈ C. For every j ∈ {0, . . . , n}, we have |v′(x, j) − jn | ≤ O(ǫ).
See Appendix F for the proof of Claim 31.
We are now ready to complete the proof of Theorem 23, i.e., we will show that v is O(ǫ)-
close to the random dictatorship voting rule. Let P = (P1, . . . , Pn) ∈ Pn, let x ∈ C, and let
j = |{i ∈ [n] : top(Pi) = x}|. We will show that |v(x,P ) − jn | ≤ O(ǫ). By Claim 28, we have
|v(x,P ) − v′(x, j)| ≤ O(ǫ), and by Claim 31, we also have |v′(x, j) − jn | ≤ O(ǫ). Thus, by the
triangle inequality, we have |v(x,P )− jn | ≤ O(ǫ), as required. This completes the proof of Theorem
23.
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Appendix A Background Information on the Gibbard-Satterthwaite
Theorem
Roughly speaking, a voting rule is said to be strategy-proof if no voter can gain utility in expectation
by lying about her true preferences. We now give the formal definition of strategy-proof.
Definition 32 (Strategy-proof). A voting rule v : Pn → ∆(C) is strategy-proof if for every i ∈ [n],
every preference profile P−i ∈ Pn−1, every pair of preference orderings Pi, P ′i ∈ P, and every utility
function ui that is consistent with Pi, we have
E[ui(v(P−i, Pi))] ≥ E[ui(v(P−i, P ′i ))].
It is desirable for a voting rule to be strategy-proof, since we can then expect voters to honestly
submit their true preferences, and thus the candidate chosen by the voting rule will better reflect
the voters’ true preferences. Unfortunately, if there are at least three candidates, then it is not
possible for a deterministic and onto voting rule to be strategy-proof unless it is dictatorial, i.e.,
there exists some voter i such that the voting rule simply always chooses voter i’s top choice.
This was shown independently by Gibbard [Gib73] and Satterthwaite [Sat75], and is known as the
Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem.
Theorem 33 (Gibbard-Satterthwaite [Gib73, Sat75]). Suppose there are at least three candidates,
i.e., |C| ≥ 3. Let v : Pn → C be any deterministic voting rule that is onto and strategy-proof. Then,
v is dictatorial, i.e., there exists an i ∈ [n] such that v(P1, . . . , Pn) = top(Pi) for every preference
profile (P1, . . . , Pn) ∈ Pn.
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem considers voting rules that are deterministic. However,
several years later, Gibbard [Gib77] generalized the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem to randomized
voting rules. Before we state Gibbard’s generalized impossibility result, let us state some required
definitions. A (randomized) voting rule v : Pn → ∆(C) is said to be unilateral if it only depends
on the preference of a single voter, i.e., there exists an i ∈ [n] such that v(P ) = v(P ′) for every
P = (P1, . . . , Pn),P
′ = (P ′1, . . . , P
′
n) ∈ Pn such that Pi = P ′i . A (randomized) voting rule v : Pn →
∆(C) is said to be duple if v always chooses some candidate from a fixed set of two candidates, i.e.,
there exist candidates x, y ∈ C such that v(z,P ) = 0 for every z ∈ C \ {x, y} and P ∈ Pn.
Intuitively, when there are at least three candidates, both unilateral rules and duple rules are
undesirable, since the former only consider a single voter’s preference, and the latter essentially
ignore all but two candidates. Gibbard’s generalized impossibility result [Gib77] states that any
randomized strategy-proof voting rule is a probability distribution over unilateral rules and duple
rules.
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Theorem 34 (Gibbard [Gib77]). Let v : Pn → ∆(C) be any randomized voting rule that is strategy-
proof. Then, v is a distribution over unilateral rules and duple rules, i.e., there exist randomized
voting rules v1, . . . , vt and weights α1, . . . , αt ∈ (0, 1] with
∑t
i=1 αi = 1, such that each vi is unilateral
or duple, and v(x,P ) = α1v1(x,P ) + · · · + αtvt(x,P ) for every P ∈ Pn and x ∈ C.
A corollary of Gibbard’s impossibility result is that if a randomized voting rule is strategy-proof
and Pareto efficient, then it is a probability distribution over dictatorial voting rules.
Corollary 35 (Gibbard [Gib77]). Let v : Pn → ∆(C) be any randomized voting rule that is
strategy-proof and Pareto efficient. Then, v is a distribution over dictatorial voting rules, i.e.,
there exist dictatorial voting rules v1, . . . , vt and weights α1, . . . , αt ∈ (0, 1] with
∑t
i=1 αi = 1, such
that v(x,P ) = α1v1(x,P ) + · · · + αtvt(x,P ) for every P ∈ Pn and x ∈ C.
Appendix B Forming a Belief from Observations
We now describe how forming a belief from observations using empirical frequencies or a Dirichlet
distribution yields α-coarse beliefs, where α is inversely proportional to the number of observations.
Forming a belief using empirical frequencies. Consider a voter that forms a belief φ based
on ℓ observations P1, . . . , Pℓ by simply setting φ(P ) to be the relative frequency of P in P1, . . . , Pℓ,
i.e., φ(P ) =
|{j∈[ℓ]:Pj=P}|
ℓ . We see that the resulting belief φ is (1/ℓ)-coarse.
Forming a belief using a Dirichlet distribution. Let us first describe a common method of
forming a belief based on observations of preferences. We begin with some initial distribution (e.g.,
the uniform distribution) over the set of all beliefs, and as we make observations, we update this
distribution using Bayes’ Rule. At any time, our distribution over beliefs can be used to form a
single belief by taking the expectation of the distribution over beliefs; equivalently, the single belief
is the resulting distribution over preferences obtained by first sampling a belief from the distribution
over beliefs, and then sampling a preference from the sampled belief.
At the beginning when no samples of preferences have been observed yet, we are indifferent
between different possible beliefs, so we start with the uniform distribution over the set ∆(P) of all
beliefs. Then, given an observation of a preference ordering P1, we update the uniform distribution
over ∆(P) by conditioning on the event that the sample P1 is observed. Upon further observations
P2, . . . , Pℓ, we update the current distribution over ∆(P) by conditioning on each of the observations
P2, . . . , Pℓ separately in sequence. The resulting distribution over beliefs can be “collapsed” to give
us a single belief as described above.
The distributions over beliefs that we obtain can be described by the Dirichlet distribution.
The Dirichlet distribution Dir(α) of order K ≥ 2 with parameters α = (α1, . . . , αK) > 0 has a pdf
given by fα(x1, . . . , xK) ∼
∏K
i=1 x
αi−1
i for every (x1, . . . , xK) ∈ RK such that
∑K
i=1 xi = 1, and is
0 elsewhere. In our context of updating beliefs, we fix an arbitrary ordering of the preferences in
P, and we let K = |P|, so (x1, . . . , xK) (with
∑K
i=1 xi = 1) are the probability masses describing a
belief. The uniform distribution over the set of all beliefs is the Dirichlet distribution Dir(1, . . . , 1).
It is known that if the current distribution over beliefs is Dir(α) and we observe P1, . . . , Pℓ, then
the resulting distribution over beliefs obtained by conditioning on P1, . . . , Pℓ is Dir(α+ c), where
c is the vector of counts representing how many times each preference ordering appears in the
observations P1, . . . , Pℓ. It is also known that for any α
′ = (α′1, . . . , α
′
K), the expectation of
Dir(α′) is 1∑K
i=1 α
′
i
· (α′1, . . . , α′K). Let α = (1, . . . , 1) (vector of K 1’s), and let α′ = α+ c, where
c is as described above. Noting that ||c||1 = ℓ (since there are ℓ observations), the expectation of
Dir(α′) is 1K+ℓ · (α′1, . . . , α′K). Since the belief formed from Dir(α′) is the expectation of Dir(α′),
and since the α′i’s are integers, we see that the obtained belief is
1
K+ℓ -coarse.
20
Appendix C Proofs for Section 3.1 and 3.2
Theorem 8. Let f : P∗ → ∆(2C) be any elimination rule, and let s = {sA}A⊆C,A 6=∅ be any selection
rule. Let δ : N → R be any function. Suppose there exists a polynomial p(·) such that for every
α > 0 and every n ≥ p( 1α ), the following holds:
• For every i ∈ [n] and every α-coarse i.i.d. belief φi, there exists a non-empty subset A ⊆ C of
candidates such that the following conditions hold:
– For every Pi ∈ P, the elimination rule f(P−i, Pi) chooses (to keep) A with probability
at least 1− δ(n) over the randomness of P−i ∼ φin−1 and f .
– sA is strategy-proof w.r.t. the restricted belief φi|A.
Then, the voting rule v : P∗ → ∆(C) defined by v(P ) = s(P |f(P )) is large-scale 2δ-strategy-proof
w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, and the rate of v is the polynomial p(·).
Proof. Let α > 0, let n ≥ p(1/α), let i ∈ [n], let Pi, P ′i ∈ P, let φi be any α-coarse i.i.d. belief, and
let ui be any utility function that is consistent with Pi. Let P−i ∼ φin−1. We will show that
E[ui(v(P−i, Pi))] ≥ E[ui(v(P−i, P ′i ))] − 2δ(n). (1)
Let A be the set of candidates guaranteed by the assumptions of the theorem statement. Consider
an alternate voting rule v′ : P∗ → ∆(C) defined by v′(P ) = s(P |A). Since the elimination rule
f(P−i, Pi) chooses A with probability at least 1 − δ(n), it is easy to see that for every P ∈ P, we
have ||v(P−i, P )− v′(P−i, P )||1 ≤ δ(n). Thus, we have
|E[ui(v(P−i, Pi))]− E[ui(v′(P−i, Pi))]|
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
c∈C
Pr[v(P−i, Pi) = c] · ui(c)−
∑
c∈C
Pr[v′(P−i, Pi) = c] · ui(c)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
c∈C
|Pr[v(P−i, Pi) = c]− Pr[v′(P−i, Pi) = c]| · |ui(c)|
≤ δ(n). (2)
Similarly, we also have
|E[ui(v(P−i, P ′i ))]− E[ui(v′(P−i, P ′i ))]| ≤ δ(n). (3)
Since sA is strategy-proof w.r.t. φi|A, we have E[ui(v′(P−i, Pi))] ≥ E[ui(v′(P−i, P ′i ))]. Combining
this with (2) and (3) yields (1), as required.
Theorem 10. Let 0 < δ < 1/2, and let vpl be the voting rule defined above Theorem 10 in the body
of the paper. Then, vpl satisfies the following properties:
1. vpl is large-scale (e
−Ω(n2δ))-strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, with rate p(x) = O(x⌈1/(1/2−δ)⌉).
2. vpl is Pareto efficient.
3. vpl is n
1/2+δ-close to optimal in the sense that vpl always chooses a candidate c ∈ C such that
the number of top-choice votes for c is within n1/2+δ of the highest number of top-choice votes
among the candidates.
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Proof. Property 3 clearly follows from the definition of vpl. We will now show Property 2. Let
P ∈ Pn be a preference profile such that every voter in P prefers candidate x over candidate y.
We note that in order for candidate y to be chosen as the winner, candidate y must be in the set
of remaining candidates in Stage 2. However, when this occurs, candidate x would also be in the
set of remaining candidates in Stage 2, since candidate x always has a count that is higher than
that of candidate y. Thus, candidate y would have no top-choice votes in Stage 2, so it cannot be
chosen as the winner by the plurality rule in Stage 2. We have now shown Property 2.
We will now show Property 1. We will use our general framework, i.e., Theorem 8. The
elimination rule f : P∗ → ∆(2C) corresponds to Stage 1, i.e., it chooses to keep the candidates
that are remaining at the end of Stage 1. The selection rule s = {sA}A⊆C,A 6=∅ runs the plurality
rule on the remaining candidates with respect to the restricted preference profile. For each non-
empty A ⊆ C, let Φ′A be the set of beliefs φ (over the set of all preference orderings on A) where
every candidate in A has the same probability of being the top choice. It is not hard to verify
that the plurality rule, and thus the selection rule, is strategy-proof with respect to each Φ′A. Let
p(x) = (3x + 1)⌈1/(1/2−δ)⌉ , let α > 0, let n ≥ p(1/α), let i ∈ [n], and let φi be any α-coarse
i.i.d. belief.
Given a preference ordering P and a candidate x ∈ C, let points(x, P ) be 1 if x is the top choice
in P , and 0 otherwise. Let A be the set of candidates remaining after the following procedure:
• Let S = C, and repeatedly do the following until no more candidates are eliminated: Eliminate
all the candidates a ∈ S such that EP∼φi[points(a, P |S)] < maxa′∈S EP∼φi [points(a′, P |S)],
and let S be the set of remaining candidates.
We will show that the following conditions hold:
• For every Pi ∈ P, the elimination rule f(P−i, Pi) chooses (to keep) A with probability at
least 1− e−Ω(n2δ) over the randomness of P−i ∼ φin−1 and f .
• The restriction of φi to A results in a belief in Φ′A.
The second condition holds because from the definition of A, we see that for every a ∈ A, we have
PrP∼φi [top(P |A) = a] = EP∼φi [points(a, P |A)] = maxa′∈A EP∼φi [points(a′, P |A)]. Thus, we now
show the first condition.
Let Pi ∈ P. Consider the execution of one iteration of the loop in Stage 1. Suppose the current
set of remaining candidates is S and we are currently at Stage 1. LetM = maxa′∈S EP∼φi[points(a
′, P |S)].
Let E be the set of candidates a ∈ S such that EP∼φi[points(a, P |S)] =M . We first show that for
each candidate y ∈ S \E, we have
EP∼φi[points(y, P |S)] ≤M − α. (1)
It suffices to show that for every x, y ∈ S, we have |EP∼φi [points(x, P |S)]−EP∼φi[points(y, P |S)]| =
0 or |EP∼φi[points(x, P |S)]−EP∼φi[points(y, P |S)]| ≥ α. To see this, let x, y ∈ S, and observe that
|EP∼φi[points(x, P |S)]− EP∼φi [points(y, P |S)]|
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
P∈P
φi(P ) · points(x, P |S)−
∑
P∈P
φi(P ) · points(y, P |S)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
P∈P
φi(P ) · (points(x, P |S)− points(y, P |S))
∣∣∣∣∣ . (2)
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Since φi is α-coarse, there exists a β ≥ α such that for every P ∈ P, φi(P ) is a multiple of β. Thus,
each term of the sum in (2) is a multiple of β, and so the sum is also a multiple of β. Thus, the
entire expression in (2) is either 0 or at least β ≥ α, as required. Thus, we have shown (1).
Let Pi′ ∼ φi independently for every i′ ∈ [n]\{i}, and let score−i(x) =
∑
i′∈[n]\{i} points(x, Pi′ |S)
for every x ∈ S. By a Chernoff bound, for each x ∈ S, we have
Pr[|score−i(x)− E[score−i(x)]| ≥ n1/2+δ/4] ≤ e−Ω(n2δ).
Now, by the union bound, we have
Pr[∃x ∈ S : |score−i(x)− E[score−i(x)]| ≥ n1/2+δ/4] ≤ m · e−Ω(n2δ) = e−Ω(n2δ). (3)
Since E[score−i(x)] = (n− 1) ·M for every x ∈ E, it follows from (3) that
Pr[∃x, y ∈ E : |score−i(x)− score−i(y)| ≥ n1/2+δ/2] ≤ e−Ω(n2δ). (4)
From (1), we have EP∼φi[points(y, P |S)] ≤ M − α for every y ∈ S \ E. Thus, E[score−i(y)] =
(n − 1) · EP∼φi [points(y, P |S)] ≤ (n − 1)M − (n − 1)α < (n − 1)M − 2n1/2+δ for every y ∈ S \ E,
so it also follows from (3) that
Pr[∃x ∈ S \ E, y ∈ E : score−i(x) ≥ score−i(y)− n1/2+δ − 1] ≤ e−Ω(n2δ). (5)
Since the elimination rule f eliminates precisely the candidates that have a score (i.e., count) that
is not within n1/2+δ of the maximum score among the candidates, and since voter i’s preference
ordering Pi adds at most 1 to the score of a candidate, we see (from (4), (5), and the union bound)
that with probability at least 1 − e−Ω(n2δ), precisely the candidates in S \ E will be eliminated in
the current iteration of Stage 1. Thus, at each iteration, with probability at least 1− e−Ω(n2δ), the
set of candidates that get eliminated in the iteration precisely matches the set of candidates that
would be eliminated in the procedure used to define A. Thus, by the union bound, we have that
with probability at least 1−m · e−Ω(n2δ) = 1− e−Ω(n2δ), the elimination rule f(P−i, Pi) chooses (to
keep) A.
Now, by Theorem 8, vpl is large-scale e
−Ω(n2δ)-strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, with
rate p(x) = O(x⌈1/(1/2−δ)⌉).
Theorem 12. Let 0 < δ < 1/2, and let virv be the voting rule defined above Theorem 12 in the
body of the paper. Then, virv satisfies the following properties:
1. virv is large-scale (e
−Ω(n2δ))-strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, with rate p(x) = O(x⌈1/(1/2−δ)⌉).
2. virv is Pareto efficient.
Proof. We first show Property 2. Let P ∈ Pn be a preference profile such that every voter in P
prefers candidate x over candidate y. We note that in order for candidate y to be chosen as the
winner, candidate y must be in the set of remaining candidates in Stage 2. However, when this
occurs, candidate x would also be in the set of remaining candidates in Stage 2, since candidate
x always has a count that is higher than that of candidate y. Thus, candidate y would have no
top-choice votes in Stage 2, so it cannot be chosen as the winner by the plurality rule in Stage 2.
We have now shown Property 2.
We will now show Property 1. We will use our general framework, i.e., Theorem 8. The
elimination rule f : P∗ → ∆(2C) corresponds to Stage 1, i.e., it chooses to keep the candidates
that are remaining at the end of Stage 1. The selection rule s = {sA}A⊆C,A 6=∅ runs the plurality
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rule on the remaining candidates with respect to the restricted preference profile. For each non-
empty A ⊆ C, let Φ′A be the set of beliefs φ (over the set of all preference orderings on A) where
every candidate in A has the same probability of being the top choice. It is not hard to verify
that the plurality rule, and thus the selection rule, is strategy-proof with respect to each Φ′A. Let
p(x) = (3x + 1)⌈1/(1/2−δ)⌉ , let α > 0, let n ≥ p(1/α), let i ∈ [n], and let φi be any α-coarse
i.i.d. belief.
Given a preference ordering P and a candidate x ∈ C, let points(x, P ) be 1 if x is the top choice
in P , and 0 otherwise. Let A be the set of candidates remaining after the following procedure:
• Initialize S := C, and repeat the following: Eliminate all the candidates a ∈ S such that
EP∼φi [points(a, P |S)] = mina′∈S EP∼φi [points(a′, P |S)], unless this would eliminate all the
remaining candidates, in which case we stop and exit the repeat loop without eliminating any
of the remaining candidates. Let S be the new set of remaining candidates.
We will show that the following conditions hold:
• For every Pi ∈ P, the elimination rule f(P−i, Pi) chooses (to keep) A with probability at
least 1− e−Ω(n2δ) over the randomness of P−i ∼ φin−1 and f .
• The restriction of φi to A results in a belief in Φ′A.
The second condition holds because from the definition of A, we see that for every a ∈ A, we have
PrP∼φi [top(P |A) = a] = EP∼φi [points(a, P |A)] = maxa′∈A EP∼φi [points(a′, P |A)]. Thus, we now
show the first condition.
Let Pi ∈ P. Consider the execution of one iteration of the loop in Stage 1. Suppose the current
set of remaining candidates is S and we are currently at Stage 1. LetM = mina′∈S EP∼φi[points(a
′, P |S)].
Let E be the set of candidates a ∈ S such that EP∼φi[points(a, P |S)] =M . We first show that for
each candidate y ∈ S \E, we have
EP∼φi[points(y, P |S)] ≥M + α. (1)
It suffices to show that for every x, y ∈ S, we have |EP∼φi [points(x, P |S)]−EP∼φi[points(y, P |S)]| =
0 or |EP∼φi [points(x, P |S)] − EP∼φi[points(y, P |S)]| ≥ α. To this end, let x, y ∈ S, and observe
that
|EP∼φi[points(x, P |S)]− EP∼φi [points(y, P |S)]|
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
P∈P
φi(P ) · points(x, P |S)−
∑
P∈P
φi(P ) · points(y, P |S)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
P∈P
φi(P ) · (points(x, P |S)− points(y, P |S))
∣∣∣∣∣ . (2)
Since φi is α-coarse, there exists a β ≥ α such that for every P ∈ P, φi(P ) is a multiple of β. Thus,
each term of the sum in (2) is a multiple of β, and so the sum is also a multiple of β. Thus, the
entire expression in (2) is either 0 or at least β ≥ α, as required. Thus, we have shown (1).
Let Pi′ ∼ φi independently for every i′ ∈ [n]\{i}, and let score−i(x) =
∑
i′∈[n]\{i} points(x, Pi′ |S)
for every x ∈ S. By a Chernoff bound, for each x ∈ S, we have
Pr[|score−i(x)− E[score−i(x)]| ≥ n1/2+δ/4] ≤ e−Ω(n2δ).
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Now, by the union bound, we have
Pr[∃x ∈ S : |score−i(x)− E[score−i(x)]| ≥ n1/2+δ/4] ≤ m · e−Ω(n2δ) = e−Ω(n2δ). (3)
Since E[score−i(x)] = (n− 1) ·M for every x ∈ E, it follows from (3) that
Pr[∃x, y ∈ E : |score−i(x)− score−i(y)| ≥ n1/2+δ/2] ≤ e−Ω(n2δ). (4)
From (1), we have EP∼φi[points(y, P |S)] ≥ M + α for every y ∈ S \ E. Thus, E[score−i(y)] =
(n − 1) · EP∼φi [points(y, P |S)] ≥ (n − 1)M + (n − 1)α > (n − 1)M + 2n1/2+δ for every y ∈ S \ E,
so it also follows from (3) that
Pr[∃x ∈ S \ E, y ∈ E : score−i(x) ≤ score−i(y) + n1/2+δ + 1] ≤ e−Ω(n2δ). (5)
Since the elimination rule f eliminates precisely the candidates that have a score (i.e., count) that
is not within n1/2+δ of the minimum score among the candidates, and since voter i’s preference
ordering Pi adds at most 1 to the score of a candidate, we see (from (4), (5), and the union bound)
that with probability at least 1 − e−Ω(n2δ), precisely the candidates in E will be eliminated in the
current iteration of Stage 1. Thus, at each iteration, with probability at least 1 − e−Ω(n2δ), the
set of candidates that get eliminated in the iteration precisely matches the set of candidates that
would be eliminated in the procedure used to define A. Thus, by the union bound, we have that
with probability at least 1−m · e−Ω(n2δ) = 1− e−Ω(n2δ), the elimination rule f(P−i, Pi) chooses (to
keep) A.
Now, by Theorem 8, virv is large-scale e
−Ω(n2δ)-strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, with
rate p(x) = O(x⌈1/(1/2−δ)⌉).
Appendix D More Examples of our General Framework
A (positional) scoring rule is a voting rule where each candidate x receives a certain number of
points from each voter i depending on the position of x in voter i’s preference ordering, and the
candidate with the highest total score wins (breaking ties in some way). A scoring rule has a points
vector (p1, . . . , pm) ∈ Nm associated with it; for each voter i with submitted preference ordering
Pi, the j
th top candidate in Pi receives pj points. There are many well-known examples of scoring
rules, such as the following:
• Plurality: The plurality voting rule chooses the candidate with the most top-choice votes
(breaking ties in some way). This is simply a scoring rule with the points vector (1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈
N
m.
• Borda count: The Borda count voting rule is a scoring rule with the points vector (m,m −
1, . . . , 1) ∈ Nm (recall that m is the number of candidates).
Example 36 (Scoring Rule Elimination + Input-Independent Selection). Let 0 < δ < 1/2,
and let vscore : P∗ → ∆(C) be any voting rule defined as follows; on input a preference profile
P ∈ Pn, vscore does the following:
Stage 1: Use a scoring rule to compute the scores of the candidates, and then eliminate all the
candidates with a score that is not within n1/2+δ of the highest score among the candidates.
Stage 2: Choose a winner (deterministically or randomly) from the remaining candidates in any
way that does not depend on the input preference profile.
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Using our general framework, we now show that vscore is large-scale ǫ-strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse
i.i.d. beliefs (where ǫ is exponentially small), and also satisfies certain efficiency properties.
Theorem 37. Let 0 < δ < 1/2, and let vscore be the voting rule defined above. Then, vscore satisfies
the following properties:
1. vscore is large-scale (e
−Ω(n2δ))-strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, with rate p(x) = O(x⌈1/(1/2−δ)⌉).
2. vscore is Pareto efficient if the points vector of the scoring rule is strictly decreasing, or if the
scoring rule is the plurality rule and n is sufficiently large.
3. vscore is n
1/2+δ-close to optimal in the sense that vscore always chooses a candidate c ∈ C such
that the score of c is within n1/2+δ of the highest score among the candidates.
Proof. Property 3 clearly follows from the definition of vscore. We will now show Property 2. Let
P ∈ Pn be a preference profile such that every voter in P prefers candidate x over candidate y. It
suffices to show that candidate y will be eliminated by vscore, i.e., the score of y is not within n
1/2+δ
of the maximum score among the candidates. If the points vector of the scoring rule is strictly
decreasing, then the score of x is at least n more than the score of y (since the points in the points
vector are integers), as required. On the other hand, if the scoring rule is the plurality rule, then
the score of y is 0 while the maximum score among the candidates is at least n/(|C|− 1); when n is
sufficiently large, the score of y is not within n1/2+δ of the maximum score among the candidates,
as required. We have shown Property 2.
We will now show Property 1. We will use our general framework, i.e., Theorem 8. The
elimination rule f : P∗ → ∆(2C) corresponds to Stage 1, i.e., f chooses to keep the candidates that
are within n1/2+δ of the maximum score among the candidates. The selection rule s = {sA}A⊆C,A 6=∅
is the rule used in Stage 2. Clearly, for every non-empty A ⊆ C, sA is strategy-proof with respect
to the set of all beliefs. Let p(x) = (3x+1)⌈1/(1/2−δ)⌉ , let α > 0, let n ≥ p(1/α), let i ∈ [n], and let
φi be any α-coarse i.i.d. belief.
Let (p1, . . . , pm) ∈ Nm be the points vector associated with vscore. Given a preference ordering
P and a candidate x ∈ C, let points(x, P ) be the number of points candidate x would receive from
a voter with submitted preference ordering P , i.e., points(x, P ) = pj, where j is the position of
candidate x in P , with the topmost position being position 1.
Let M = maxa′∈C EP∼φi [points(a
′, P )]. Let A be the set of candidates a ∈ C such that
EP∼φi[points(a, P )] =M . We will show that the following holds:
• For every Pi ∈ P, the elimination rule f(P−i, Pi) chooses (to keep) A with probability at
least 1− e−Ω(n2δ) over the randomness of P−i ∼ φin−1 and f .
Let Pi ∈ P. We first show that for each candidate y ∈ C \ A, we have
EP∼φi[points(y, P )] ≤M − α. (1)
It suffices to show that for every x, y ∈ C, we have |EP∼φi[points(x, P )]− EP∼φi [points(y, P )]| = 0
or |EP∼φi [points(x, P )]− EP∼φi[points(y, P )]| ≥ α. To see this, let x, y ∈ C, and observe that
|EP∼φi[points(x, P )]− EP∼φi [points(y, P )]|
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
P∈P
φi(P ) · points(x, P )−
∑
P∈P
φi(P ) · points(y, P )
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
P∈P
φi(P ) · (points(x, P )− points(y, P ))
∣∣∣∣∣ . (2)
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Since φi is α-coarse, there exists a β ≥ α such that for every P ∈ P, φi(P ) is a multiple of β. Thus,
each term of the sum in (2) is a multiple of β, and so the sum is also a multiple of β. Thus, the
entire expression in (2) is either 0 or at least β ≥ α, as required. Thus, we have shown (1).
Let Pi′ ∼ φi independently for every i′ ∈ [n] \{i}, and let score−i(x) =
∑
i′∈[n]\{i} points(x, Pi′)
for every x ∈ C. By a Chernoff bound, for each y ∈ C, we have
Pr[|score−i(y)− E[score−i(y)]| ≥ n1/2+δ/4] ≤ e−Ω(n2δ).
Now, by the union bound, we have
Pr[∃x ∈ C : |score−i(x)− E[score−i(x)]| ≥ n1/2+δ/4] ≤ m · e−Ω(n2δ) = e−Ω(n2δ). (3)
Since E[score−i(x)] = (n− 1) ·M for every x ∈ A, it follows from (3) that
Pr[∃x, y ∈ A : |score−i(x)− score−i(y)| ≥ n1/2+δ/2] ≤ e−Ω(n2δ). (4)
From (1), we have EP∼φi [points(y, P )] ≤ M − α for every y ∈ C \ A. Thus, E[score−i(y)] =
(n− 1) · EP∼φi[points(y, P )] ≤ (n − 1)M − (n− 1)α < (n− 1)M − 2n1/2+δ for every y ∈ C \ A, so
it also follows from (3) that
Pr[∃x ∈ C \ A, y ∈ A : score−i(x) ≥ score−i(y)− n1/2+δ − max
j∈[m]
pj] ≤ e−Ω(n2δ). (5)
Since the elimination rule f eliminates precisely the candidates that have a score not within n1/2+δ
of the maximum score among the candidates, and since voter i’s preference ordering Pi adds at
most maxj∈[m] pj to the score of any candidate, we see (from (4), (5), and the union bound) that
with probability at least 1− e−Ω(n2δ), the elimination rule f(P−i, Pi) chooses to keep A.
Now, by Theorem 8, vscore is large-scale e
−Ω(n2δ)-strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, with
rate p(x) = O(x⌈1/(1/2−δ)⌉).
Using plurality when there are only two candidates remaining. Whenever Stage 1 elimi-
nates all but two candidates, the voting rule vscore can actually run the plurality rule on the two
remaining candidates in Stage 2 instead of choosing a winner in a way that does not depend on
the input preference profile. This is because the plurality rule is strategy-proof when there are
only two candidates, and so the selection rule clearly still satisfies the requirements of our general
framework. This improvement to the voting rule vscore can be especially useful when it is widely
believed that there are two “strong” candidates that are much more preferred by the voters than
the other candidates.
Appendix E Proofs for Section 3.3
Lemma 13. The voting rule vpunish is “strictly strategy-proof” in the following sense: For every
α > 0, every i ∈ [n], every pair of preference orderings Pi, P ′i ∈ P with Pi 6= P ′i , every P−i ∈ Pn−1,
and every α-coarse utility function ui that is consistent with Pi, we have
E[ui(vpunish(P−i, Pi))] ≥ E[ui(vpunish(P−i, P ′i ))] + Ω(α/n).
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The proof of Lemma 13 roughly works as follows. If a voter lies about her preference by swapping
two adjacent candidates in her preference ordering, then with probability 1/n, the voter will be
chosen, and she will lose a constant amount of expected utility; this is because the less preferred
candidate is now higher and thus will be chosen with higher probability, while the more preferred
candidate is now lower and thus will be chosen with lower probability (and the utilities assigned to
the two swapped candidates have an α gap between them, since the utility function is α-coarse).
We show that we can obtain any (false) preference ordering from the true preference ordering by
performing a sequence of swaps of adjacent candidates, where the less preferred candidate (according
to the true preference) is always swapped upwards; each of these swaps causes the voter to lose
Ω(α/n) expected utility, as described earlier. Thus, the lemma holds.
Proof. Let α > 0, let i ∈ [n], let Pi, P ′i ∈ P with Pi 6= P ′i , let P−i ∈ Pn−1, and let ui : C → [0, 1] be
any α-coarse utility function that is consistent with Pi. We will show that
E[ui(vpunish(P−i, Pi))] ≥ E[ui(vpunish(P−i, P ′i ))] + Ω(α/n). (1)
Let P = (P−i, Pi) and P
′ = (P−i, P
′
i ). Let a1, . . . , am be the ordering of the candidates in the
preference ordering P ′i , with a1 being the top (highest-ranked) candidate in P
′
i . We observe that
P ′ can be obtained from P by performing the following sequence of swaps of adjacent candidates
in voter i’s preference ordering (similar to how bubble sort works): We first take the candidate a1
in the preference ordering Pi and move a1 to the top position by repeatedly swapping a1 with the
candidate directly above; this makes the top candidate of the resulting preference ordering coincide
with the top candidate of P ′i . We then take the candidate a2 in the resulting preference ordering
and move a2 to the second top position by repeatedly swapping the candidate with the candidate
directly above; this makes the top two candidates of the resulting preference ordering coincide with
the top two candidates of P ′. We then take the candidate a3 in the resulting preference ordering
and move the candidate to the third top position by repeatedly swapping the candidate with the
candidate directly above. It is easy to see that by continuing this process in the natural way, we
will eventually get the preference ordering P ′i .
We now analyze how the expected utility E[ui(vpunish(P−i, ·))] changes as we perform the swaps
to get from Pi to P
′
i for voter i’s preference ordering. We note that for each swap, we are swapping
a pair of adjacent candidates, say x and y with x on top of y (before the swap), such that the
preference ordering Pi ranks x higher than y. Let Qi and Q
′
i denote the two preference orderings
for voter i before and after such a swap, respectively. Now, we observe that
E[ui(vpunish(P−i, Q
′
i))] − E[ui(vpunish(P−i, Qi))]
=
1
n
[ui(x) · vpunish(x, (P−i, Q′i)) + ui(y) · vpunish(y, (P−i, Q′i))]
− 1
n
[ui(x) · vpunish(x, (P−i, Qi)) + ui(y) · vpunish(y, (P−i, Qi))]
=
1
n
ui(x) · [vpunish(x, (P−i, Q′i))− vpunish(x, (P−i, Qi))]
+
1
n
ui(y) · [vpunish(y, (P−i, Q′i))− vpunish(y, (P−i, Qi))]
=
1
n
ui(x) ·
(
− 1∑m
k=1(m− k)
)
+
1
n
ui(y) ·
(
1∑m
k=1(m− k)
)
=
1
n
(ui(y)− ui(x)) ·
(
2
m(m− 1)
)
.
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Since the preference ordering Pi ranks x higher than y, and since the utility function ui is consistent
with Pi, we have ui(x) > ui(y), so ui(y)− ui(x) ≤ −α (since ui is α-coarse). Thus, we have
E[ui(vpunish(P−i, Q
′
i))] − E[ui(vpunish(P−i, Qi))] ≤ −Ω(α/n).
Thus, the expected utility E[ui(vpunish(P−i, ·))] goes down by at least Ω(α/n) each time we perform
a swap in the sequence of swaps to get from Pi to P
′
i for voter i’s preference ordering. This implies
that E[ui(vpunish(P−i, Pi))] ≥ E[ui(vpunish(P−i, P ′i ))]+Ω(α/n), which shows (1), as required. This
completes the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 14. Let v : P∗ → ∆(C) be any voting rule that is large-scale ǫ-strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse
i.i.d. beliefs, where ǫ(n) = o(1/n2). Let vmix be the voting rule that runs v with probability 1− q(n)
and runs vpunish with probability q(n), where q(n) = Ω(n
2 ·ǫ(n)). Then, vmix is large-scale strategy-
proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs.
The proof of Lemma 14 roughly works as follows. By Lemma 13, if a voter lies about her
preference, she will gain at most ǫ = o(1/n2) expected utility if vmix runs the voting rule v, but
she will lose at least Ω(α/n) expected utility if vmix runs the voting rule vpunish, where α is the
coarseness of her utility function. The probability q that vmix runs vpunish is appropriately chosen
so that overall, the voter does not gain any expected utility from lying. See Appendix E for the
proof of Lemma 14.
Proof. Let p(x) be the maximum of pold(x) and x, where pold(·) is the p(·) guaranteed by the
large-scale ǫ-strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs property of v. Let α > 0, let n ≥ p(1/α), let
i ∈ [n], let Pi, P ′i ∈ P with Pi 6= P ′i , let φi be any α-coarse i.i.d. belief, and let ui be any α-coarse
utility function that is consistent with Pi. Let P−i ∼ φin−1. Since v is large-scale ǫ-strategy-proof
w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, we have
E[ui(v(P−i, Pi))] ≥ E[ui(v(P−i, P ′i ))]− ǫ(n).
By Lemma 13, we also have
E[ui(vpunish(P−i, Pi))] ≥ E[ui(vpunish(P−i, P ′i ))] + α/n.
Now, we observe that
E[ui(vmix(P−i, Pi))]
= (1− q(n)) · E[ui(v(P−i, Pi))] + q(n) · E[ui(vpunish(P−i, Pi))]
≥ (1− q(n)) · (E[ui(v(P−i, P ′i ))]− ǫ(n)) + q(n) · (E[ui(vpunish(P−i, P ′i ))] + α/n)
= (1− q(n)) · E[ui(v(P−i, P ′i ))] + q(n) · E[ui(vpunish(P−i, P ′i ))]− (1− q(n)) · ǫ(n) + q(n)α/n
= E[ui(vmix(P−i, P
′
i ))]− (1− q(n)) · ǫ(n) + q(n)α/n. (1)
Now, we observe that by choosing q(n) = Ω(n2 · ǫ(n)) appropriately, we have −(1 − q(n)) · ǫ(n) +
q(n)α/n ≥ −ǫ(n) + q(n)/(n2) ≥ 0 (since α ≥ 1/n), and the lemma follows.
Appendix F Proofs for our Impossibility Result (Theorem 23)
Lemma 25. Let v : Pn → ∆(C) be any anonymous randomized voting rule that is weakly strategy-
proof and satisfies ǫ-super-weak unanimity. Then, v satisfies ǫ-strong unanimity.
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Proof. Let x ∈ C, and let P = (P1, . . . , Pn) ∈ Pn such that top(Pi) = x for every i ∈ [n]. We
will show that v(x,P ) ≥ 1 − ǫ. Since v satisfies ǫ-super-weak unanimity, there exists a preference
profile P ′ = (P ′1, . . . , P
′
n) ∈ Pn with top(P ′i ) = x for every i ∈ [n], such that v(x,P ′) ≥ 1 − ǫ.
Now, we observe that since candidate x is at the top for every voter in both P and P ′, we
can obtain P ′ from P by performing a sequence of swaps of adjacent candidates (in the voters’
preference orderings) such that none of the swaps involve candidate x. Since v is pairwise responsive
(Lemma 24), the selection probability of x is not changed by any of the swaps. Thus, we have
v(x,P ) = v(x,P ′) ≥ 1− ǫ, as required.
Lemma 26. Let v : Pn → ∆(C) be any anonymous randomized voting rule that is weakly strategy-
proof and satisfies ǫ-super-weak unanimity. Then, for every pair of preference profiles P ,P ′ ∈ Pn
such that top(P ) = top(P ′), we have |v(x,P )− v(x,P ′)| ≤ mǫ for every x ∈ C.
Proof. Let C = {a1, . . . , am}, let P = (P1, . . . , Pn),P ′ = (P ′1, . . . , P ′n) ∈ Pn such that top(P ) =
top(P ′), and let x ∈ C. For j = 0, . . . ,m, let P (j) = (P (j)1, . . . , P (j)n) be defined as follows: for each
i ∈ [n], let P (j)i = P ′i if top(Pi) ∈ {a1, . . . , aj}, and let P (j)i = Pi otherwise. We note that P (0) = P
and P (m) = P ′. We will show that for every 0 ≤ j ≤ m−1, we have |v(x,P (j))− v(x,P (j+1))| ≤ ǫ.
The lemma then immediately follows by repeated application of the triangle inequality.
Let 0 ≤ j ≤ m− 1. From the definition of P (j) and P (j+1), we see that P (j) and P (j+1) only
differ in the components i ∈ [n] for which top(Pi) = aj+1; let I be the set of all such i ∈ [n]. For
each i ∈ I, we have P (j)i = Pi and P (j+1)i = P ′i . However, since top(P ) = top(P ′), top(Pi) = aj+1
is at the top of both P (j)i and P
(j+1)
i for every i ∈ I, so P (j+1) can be obtained from P (j) via a
sequence of swaps of adjacent candidates (in the preference orderings of voters in I) that do not
involve candidate aj+1. Let Q
(0), . . . ,Q(r) be any sequence of preference profiles generated by such
a sequence of swaps, where Q(0) = P (j) and Q(r) = P (j+1). Now, we observe that
v(x,P (j+1))− v(x,P (j)) =
r−1∑
k=0
(
v(x,Q(k+1))− v(x,Q(k))
)
. (1)
For each 0 ≤ k ≤ r, let Q′(k) be the same as Q(k) except that for every i ∈ [n]\I, the candidate aj+1
in the preference ordering Q(k)i is moved to the top of the preference ordering; we note that aj+1
is at the top of all the preference orderings in Q′(k). We will now show that for each 0 ≤ k ≤ r− 1,
we have
v(x,Q(k+1))− v(x,Q(k)) = v(x,Q′(k+1))− v(x,Q′(k)). (2)
Let 0 ≤ k ≤ r − 1. Recall that Q(k+1) is obtained from Q(k) by performing a swap of adjacent
candidates in the preference Q(k)i for some i ∈ I, and the swap does not involve candidate aj+1. If
the swap does not involve the candidate x, then since v is pairwise responsive (Lemma 24), both
sides of (2) are 0, which proves (2). Thus, we now assume that the swap involves the candidate x.
If the swap moves x upwards, then since v is pairwise isolated (Lemma 24), (2) holds. If the swap
moves x downwards, then the swap moves some other candidate upwards, say, candidate y. Then,
since v is pairwise responsive and the selection probabilities of the candidates must add up to 1,
we have v(x,Q(k+1)) − v(x,Q(k)) = −(v(y,Q(k+1)) − v(y,Q(k))). Since v is pairwise isolated, we
have v(y,Q(k+1))− v(y,Q(k)) = v(y,Q′(k+1))− v(y,Q′(k)) = −(v(x,Q′(k+1))− v(x,Q′(k))), where
the last equality again uses the fact that v is pairwise responsive. Combining the above equations
yields (2), as required. Thus, we have shown (2).
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Now, combining (1) and (2), we get
v(x,P (j+1))− v(x,P (j)) =
r−1∑
k=0
(
v(x,Q′
(k+1)
)− v(x,Q′(k))
)
= v(x,Q′
(r)
)− v(x,Q′(0)).
To complete the proof of the lemma, it suffices to show that |v(x,Q′(r))− v(x,Q′(0))| ≤ ǫ.
Since v satisfies ǫ-super-weak unanimity, we have that by Lemma 25, v also satisfies ǫ-strong
unanimity. Thus, we have v(aj+1,Q
′(r)) ≥ 1− ǫ and v(aj+1,Q′(0)) ≥ 1− ǫ, since candidate aj+1 is
at the top of all the preference orderings in Q′(r) and Q′(0).
If x = aj+1, then |v(x,Q′(r)) − v(x,Q′(0))| = |v(aj+1,Q′(r)) − v(aj+1,Q′(0))| ≤ ǫ, since
v(aj+1,Q
′(r)) ∈ [1− ǫ, 1] and v(aj+1,Q′(0)) ∈ [1− ǫ, 1].
If x 6= aj+1, then v(x,Q′(r)) ∈ [0, ǫ] and v(x,Q′(0)) ∈ [0, ǫ] (since v(aj+1,Q′(r)) ≥ 1 − ǫ and
v(aj+1,Q
′(0)) ≥ 1− ǫ), so |v(x,Q′(r))− v(x,Q′(0))| ≤ ǫ, as required.
This completes the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 27. Let v : Pn → ∆(C) be any anonymous randomized voting rule that is weakly strategy-
proof and satisfies ǫ-super-weak unanimity. Then, for every candidate x ∈ C, and every pair of
preference profiles P = (P1, . . . , Pn),P
′ = (P ′1, . . . , P
′
n) ∈ Pn such that |{i ∈ [n] : top(Pi) = x}| =
|{i ∈ [n] : top(P ′i ) = x}|, we have |v(x,P )− v(x,P ′)| ≤ 2mǫ.
Proof. Let x ∈ C, and let P = (P1, . . . , Pn),P ′ = (P ′1, . . . , P ′n) ∈ Pn such that |{i ∈ [n] : top(Pi) =
x}| = |{i ∈ [n] : top(P ′i ) = x}|. Let k = |{i ∈ [n] : top(Pi) = x}|. Since v is anonymous, we
can assume without loss of generality that for i = 1, . . . , k, we have top(Pi) = x and top(P
′
i ) = x.
Then, for i = k+1, . . . , n, we have top(Pi) 6= x and top(P ′i ) 6= x. Let a1, . . . , am be any ordering of
the set of candidates C such that am = x, where a1 is the highest-ranked candidate and am is the
lowest-ranked candidate. Let P ∗ = (P ∗1 , . . . , P
∗
n) be the preference profile defined as follows: for
i = 1, . . . , k, let top(P ∗i ) = x and the rest of P
∗
i is ordered according to the ordering a1, . . . , am; for
i = k + 1, . . . , n, let P ∗i be the ordering a1, . . . , am.
We first show that |v(x,P )− v(x,P ∗)| ≤ mǫ. We will perform a sequence of operations on P
to obtain P ∗, and we will analyze how these operations affect the selection probability v(x, ·) of x.
We start with P , and for every i ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n}, we simultaneously move the candidate x in Pi
to the bottom. Since top(Pi) 6= x for i = k + 1, . . . , n, by Lemma 26, this operation changes the
selection probability of x by at most mǫ. Now, we observe that from this new preference profile, we
can obtain P ∗ by performing a sequence of swaps of adjacent candidates in the preference orderings
such that none of the swaps involve candidate x. Since v is pairwise responsive (Lemma 24), none
of these swaps change the selection probability of x. Thus, the overall change in the selection
probability of x is at most mǫ, so |v(x,P )− v(x,P ∗)| ≤ mǫ, as required.
By a similar argument, we also have |v(x,P ′)−v(x,P ∗)| ≤ mǫ. Thus, by the triangle inequality,
we have |v(x,P )− v(x,P ′)| ≤ 2mǫ. This completes the proof of the lemma.
Claim 29. For every pair of candidates x, y ∈ C and every j ∈ {0, . . . , n}, we have |v′(x, j) −
v′(y, j)| ≤ 14mǫ.
Proof. Let x, y ∈ C and j ∈ [n]. Let z be any candidate in C \ {x, y}. Let P = (P1, . . . , Pn) be any
preference profile such that for every i ∈ [n], we have top(Pi) = z and candidate x is directly below
z. Now, for i = 1, . . . , j, we swap the candidates z and x in Pi so that x is now at the top; let’s
call the resulting preference profile P ′. Since the swaps we performed only involved the candidates
z and x, and since v is pairwise responsive, we have v(x,P ′)− v(x,P ) = −(v(z,P ′)− v(z,P )) =
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v′(z, n) − v′(z, n − j) + δ, where |δ| ≤ 4mǫ (by Claim 28). Now, we note that |v(x,P )| ≤ ǫ (by
strong unanimity of v), so v(x,P ′) = v′(z, n)− v′(z, n− j) + δ′, where |δ′| ≤ 5mǫ. Thus, by Claim
28, we have v′(x, j) = v′(z, n)− v′(z, n − j) + γ, where |γ| ≤ 7mǫ.
By a similar argument but where we use y instead of x, we also have v′(y, j) = v′(z, n)−v′(z, n−
j) + γ′, where |γ′| ≤ 7mǫ. Thus, we have
|v′(x, j)− v′(y, j)| = |γ − γ′| ≤ 14mǫ.
This completes the proof of the claim.
Claim 30. Let x ∈ C, let j, j′ ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}, and let ℓ ∈ [n] such that j + ℓ ≤ n and j′ + ℓ ≤ n.
Then,
v′(x, j + ℓ)− v′(x, j) = v′(x, j′ + ℓ)− v′(x, j′) + δ
for some δ ∈ R such that |δ| ≤ 64mǫ.
Proof. We first show that v′(x, j + ℓ) − v′(x, j) = v′(x, ℓ) − v′(x, 0) + γ, where |γ| ≤ 32mǫ. Let
y, z ∈ C such that x, y, z are all distinct. Let P = (P1, . . . , Pn) be any preference profile such that
for i = 1, . . . , j, we have top(Pi) = x, and for i = j+1, . . . , j+ ℓ, we have top(Pi) = y and candidate
x is directly below y, and for i = j+ℓ+1, . . . , n, we have top(Pi) = z. Now, for i = j+1, . . . , j+ℓ, we
swap the candidates y and x in Pi so that x is now at the top; let’s call the resulting preference profile
P ′. Since the swaps we performed only involved the candidates y and x, and since v is pairwise
responsive, we have v(x,P ′) − v(x,P ) = −(v(y,P ′) − v(y,P )) = v′(y, ℓ) − v′(y, 0) + δ′, where
|δ′| ≤ 4mǫ. Now, by Claim 29, we have |v′(y, ℓ) − v′(x, ℓ)| ≤ 14mǫ and |v′(y, 0) − v′(x, 0)| ≤ 14mǫ,
so v(x,P ′)− v(x,P ) = v′(x, ℓ)− v′(x, 0) + γ, where |γ| ≤ 32mǫ.
By a similar argument, we also have v′(x, j′ + ℓ) − v′(x, j′) = v′(x, ℓ) − v′(x, 0) + γ′, where
|γ′| ≤ 32mǫ. The claim then follows by the triangle inequality.
Claim 31. Let x ∈ C. For every j ∈ {0, . . . , n}, we have |v′(x, j) − jn | ≤ O(ǫ).
Proof. Since v satisfies ǫ-strong unanimity, we have v′(x, n) ≥ 1− ǫ and v′(x, 0) ≤ ǫ. Now, for every
q ≤ n/2, we have v′(x, 2q) − v′(x, q) = v′(x, q)− v′(x, 0) +O(ǫ) by Claim 30, so
v′(x, 2q) = 2v′(x, q) +O(ǫ). (1)
Let q ∈ {0, . . . , n} such that rq := |v′(x, q) − q/n| is maximal. We will show that rq ≤ O(ǫ).
Case 1: q ≤ n/2. By (1), we have
r2q = |v′(x, 2q) − 2q/n| = |2v′(x, q) +O(ǫ)− 2q/n| = 2rq −O(ǫ).
By the maximality of rq, we have r2q ≤ rq, so 2rq −O(ǫ) ≤ rq, so rq ≤ O(ǫ), as required.
Case 2: q > n/2. Let q′ = n − q. Then, by Claim 30, we have v′(x, q′) − v′(x, 0) = v′(x, n) −
v′(x, q) +O(ǫ), so v′(x, q′) = 1− v′(x, q) +O(ǫ). Then, we have
rq′ = |v′(x, q′)− q′/n| = |1− v′(x, q) +O(ǫ)− (n − q)/n| = rq −O(ǫ).
Now, by (1), we have
r2q′ = |v′(x, 2q′)− 2q′/n| = |2v′(x, q′) +O(ǫ)− 2q′/n| = 2rq′ −O(ǫ) = 2rq −O(ǫ).
By the maximality of rq, we have r2q′ ≤ rq, so 2rq −O(ǫ) ≤ rq, so rq ≤ O(ǫ), as required.
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